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NO. 91-1481

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

HELEN EHRET BACH, EUGENE G. BACH, III
and JANET B. LASHLEY
Petitioners

VERSUS

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC.,
KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL
CORPORATION AND THE VESSEL,
THE JAYMAT TRIDENT
Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Are bar pilots, who were considered seamen at the time of the passage of the Jones Act, no longer considered seamen because they are not permanently attached to a specific vessel or fleet of vessels?

LIST OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Counsel for petitioners, Gregory F. Gambel and Mark W. Smith of the firm, Gambel, Calvert and Smith, certify that the following listed parties have an interest in the outcome of this case. This representation is made pursuant to Rule 21.1(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States:

NAME

1. Helen Ehret Bach

2. Eugene G. Bach, III

3. Janet B. Lashley

4. Trident Steamship Company, Inc.

5. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation

6. The vessel, the JAYMAT TRIDENT

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REPORTS OF OPINIONS DELIVERED IN COURTS BELOW

The opinion on remand of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in this matter has been published in the West Reporter System as *Bach v. Trident Steamship Company, Inc.*, 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991), on remand.

The grant of writs vacating the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals original opinion entered herein and remanding for reconsideration in light of the intervening case law has been reported at 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 2253, 114 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).

The original opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this matter has been reported in the West Reporter System as *Bach v. Trident Steamship Company, Inc., et al*, 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991).

The opinions of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana can be found in *Bach v. Trident Steamship Company, Inc.*, 708 F.Supp. 776 (E.D. La. 1989).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court arises under Article III of the United States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1254, and the basis on which this Petition is predicated are Rules 10 and 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Petitioners' claim under the Jones Act was dismissed by summary judgment on October 18, 1988. All remaining claims were dismissed and a final judgment on all

issues was entered by the honorable Partick E. Carr, Judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on March 27, 1989. A timely appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was perfected. These dismissals were upheld by a three-member panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on January 10, 1991. A vigorous dissent was filed by the honorable John R. Brown, Judge. Petitioners' Request for Rehearing En Banc was denied on March 4, 1991.

Writs to the United States Supreme Court were granted on June 3, 1991 and an order entered vacating the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remanding for reconsideration in light of *McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander,* 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on remand, reinstated its original decision on December 2, 1991. These writs have folowed.

STATEMENTS OF STATUTES INVOLVED

This matter involves the interpretation of the following statutes or jurisprudence:

A. 46 U.S.C.A. Section 688(a), more commonly referred to as the Jones Act;

688(a) Application of Railway Employee Statutes Jurisdiction.

> Any SEAMAN who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with

> a right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; in the case of the death of any seamen as a result of any such personal injury, a personal representative of such seamen may maintain an action for damages at law with a right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. This jurisdiction and such action shall be under the Court of the district in which the defendant/employer resides or in which his principal office is located.

B. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3)(G) commonly referred to as the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act:

> (3) The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and shipbreaker, but such term does not include —
>
> > (G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel;...

C. *McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander*, 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed. 2d 866 (1991).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.

Petitioners herein, Helen Ehret Bach, Eugene G.

Bach, III and Janet B. Lashley, filed suit on December 23, 1987, alleging a cause of action under the Jones Act, General Maritime Law and General Negligence for the death of Capt. Eugene G. Bach, Jr., a Mississippi River bar pilot, which occurred aboard the vessel, the M/V Jaymat Trident, on December 26, 1986 on the Mississippi River in the port of New Orleans. By supplemental and amending complaint filed October 5, 1988, petitioners brought a claim under the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. 905(b) in addition to the Jones Act, General Maritime and General Negligence claims.

On September 13, 1988, defendants herein filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issues of Bach's seaman status and whether or not the warranty of seaworthiness is due a river pilot. Judgment was entered herein in favor of defendants on October 18, 1988 dismissing plaintiffs' claims under the Jones Act based on lack of seaman status and all claims for unseaworthiness under the General Maritime law. The district court ruled that since Capt. Bach was not permanently attached to a vessel or fleet or vesels, Capt. Bach failed to meet one prong of the *Robison-Barrett* seaman status test.

On March 8, 1989, Trident Steamship Company, Inc. and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining issues. This motion was granted on March 27, 1989 and plaintiffs remaining causes of action was dismissed and a final judgment as to all issues entered.

Petitioners made timely application for appeal, and on January 10, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, by a three-member panel, with the Honorable John R. Brown, in dissent, rendered its opinion upholding the decision of the court below and dismissing

petitioners' claims. Petitioners applied for Rehearing En Banc which was denied on March 4, 1991.

Writs of Certiorari were taken to the United States Supreme Court and on June 3, 1991 an order was issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of intervening Supreme Court case law.

On December 2, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reinstated its previous judgment with the Honorable John R. Brown, once again, in vigorous dissent. This writ to the United States Supreme Court has followed.

B. Statement of the Facts

1. *SUMMARY*

Petitioners' decedent, Captain Eugene G. Bach, Jr., a Mississippi River bar pilot, had been retained by defendants, Trident Steamship Company, Inc., and/or Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, to pilot the vessel, the M/V Jaymat Trident, from the Port of New Orleans to the mouth of the Mississippi River in the early morning hours of December 26, 1986. Captain Bach boarded the pilot boat, the M/V Little Ray, at the Crescent City River Pilots Association headquarters and was ferried out to the Jaymat Trident at mid-stream in the Mississippi River at the Port of New Orleans. Captain Bach boarded an accommodation ladder and then climbed approximately four flights of steps to the wheelhouse. Once there, he relieved the pilot who had been taken on board ship upriver for the Baton Rouge to New Orleans leg of the voyage. Shortly thereafter, he suffered a heart attack and collapsed in the wheelhouse of the vessel, the Jaymat Trident.

Despite the fact that the officers of the Jaymat Trident as well as the ship's medical officer were present in the wheelhouse when Capt. Bach collapsed and had been trained in first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation techniques, no one attempted to go to Captain Bach's aid. They simply allowed him to lay there offering no assistance. At some point in time, between 4 and 58 minutes after his collapse, Captain Bach died.

Dr. Jeffrey Hunter Phillips, head of the Cardiology Department at Tulane Medical Center, testified by deposition, that had Captain Bach received CPR within four minutes after his collapse, his chances of survival would have been much greater. Dr. Phillips' further testified that without CPR, Captain Bach had absolutely no chance of survival. It was Dr. Phillips' expert opinion that failure to perform CPR on Captain Bach deprived him of any chance whatsoever at survival. Petitioners have alleged that the failure of the officers of the Jaymat Trident to render first aid assistance and/or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, as they had been trained and instructed to do and were required to do under general maritime law, deprived Captain Bach of any chance at survival. Dr. Lawrence O'Meallie, the cardiologist retained by respondents, concurred that the failure of the ship's trained personnel or medical officer to institute C.P.R. on Capt. Bach reduced his chances of survival.

2. *PERTINENT FACTS*

Captain Eugene G. Bach, Jr., (hereinafter referred to as "Capt. Bach") had been a Mississippi River bar pilot for in excess of thirty years. As a bar pilot he would board vessels, either at the Port of New Orleans and guide them to Pilot Town at the mouth of the Mississippi River or vice versa. Those were his only duties. His only connection with

any particular vessel would be during the time period in which he was aboard the vessel while acting as its pilot. There was no other connection between Captain Bach and the vessel, the Jaymat Trident, or any identifiable fleet of vessels other than the fact that he was in command of all the vessels he piloted.

ARGUMENT

ARE BAR PILOTS, WHO WERE CONSIDERED SEAMEN AT THE TIME OF THE PASSAGE OF THE JONES ACT, NO LONGER CONSIDERED SEAMEN BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT PERMANENTLY ATTACHED TO A SPECIFIC VESSEL OR FLEET OF VESSELS?

The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in this matter is in conflict with this Court's recent decision in *McDermott Intern., Inc. v. Wilander,* 111 S.Ct. 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed 2d 866 (1991) as well as the order of this court which previously granted writs and vacated the judgment on this issue. *Bach v. Trident Steamship Co.,* 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 2253, 114 L.Ed 2d 706 (1991).

In denying seaman status and hence the protection of the Jones Act to Capt. Bach and all other pilots, the Fifth Circuit applied the two prong test it had fashioned in *Offshore Company v. Robison,* 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959) and refined in *Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,* 781 F.2d 1067, 1072-74 (5th Cir. 1986)(en banc). Namely, that an injured worker attains seaman statuts by proving: (i) permanent attachment to or substantial work on a vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels and (ii) contribution to the

the function or mission of the vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. The Fifth Circuit held that Capt. Bach did not meet the permanent vessel connection prong of the *Robinson-Barrett* test. This is in error in light of *Wilander*, supra, and this court's previous grant of writs on this case, *Bach*, 498 U.S. ____, 11 S.Ct. 2253, 114 L.Ed. 2d706 (1991).

It is respectfully submitted that the most important question for this Court to decide is whether bar pilots, such as Capt. Bach, were considered seamen at the time of the passage of the Jones Act. If so, then pilots must be afforded its protection. The controlling jurisprudence on this issue is this Court's recent decision in *McDermott Int'l., Inc. v. Wilander*, 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed 2d 866 (1991).

The question before the Court at that time was whether a paint foreman, who did not aid in a ship's navigation, nevertheless was a seaman for the purposes of the Jones Act. The Supreme Court held that since the Jones Act does not define who or what a seaman is, then Congress must have intended to use the term "seaman" in the same way as other admiralty courts had used it at the time of the passage of the Jones Act in 1920. Therefore those who would be considered seaman in 1920 would be considered seaman today. *Wilander*, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 811. This Court then embarked upon an analysis of the term of art, "seaman", as used by various maritime and admiralty courts prior to Congress' enactment of the Jones Act. Clearly, this Court was instructing the lower courts to determine who is a seaman by examining the general maritime law at the time Congress passed the Jones Act in 1920. *Wilander*, 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. at 811.

PILOTS STATUS BEFORE 1920

In fact, the *Wilander* decision itself cites juris-

prudence and scholaarly treatises which held pilots were seamen under the general maritime law prior to the passage of the Jones Act. The Supreme Court, with approval, quoted Justice Story in the case of *United States v. Thompson*, 28 F.Cas. 102 (NO. 16,492)(CCD Mass. 1832) when he wrote:

> A cook and steward are seamen in the sense of the maritime law, although they have peculiar duties assigned them. So a *pilot*, a surgeon, a ship-carpenter and a boatswain, are deemed seamen, entitled to sue in admiralty. *Id* (emphasis supplied).

Thus as early as 1832 pilots were held to be seamen in the admiralty jurisprudence.

Additionally, this Court quoted E. Benedict, *The American Admiralty*, Section 278, Page 158 (1850) and observed:

> By the middle of the 19th century, the leading admiralty treatise noted the wide variety of those eligible for seaman's benefits: 'Masters, mates, sailors, surveyors, carpenters, coopers, stewards, cooks, cabin boys, kitchen boys, engineers, *pilots*, firemen, deck hands, waiters, - women as well as men, - are mariners.' *Id.* at 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. at 812. (emphasis supplied).

The Supreme Court has addressed issues involving pilots in the past. Although not specifically dealing with whether or not they would be considered "seamen," inherent in these pilotage cases was that conclusion. The Supreme Court wrote of this class of mariners as follows:

> As much a part of the commercial marine as the hull of the ship and the helm by which it is guided...Pilots are a meritorious class, and the service in which they are engaged is one of great importance to the public. As frequently full of hardship, and sometimes of peril; night and day, and winter and summer, and tempest and calm, they must be present at their proper places and ready to perform the duties of their vocation.
> *Ex parte, McNeil*, 80 U.S. 236, 237-38 (1871).

In *The China*, 74 U.S. 53, 67 (1868), the Supreme Court observed that laws which require pilots aboard ships were beneficial "by providing a body of trained and skillfull *seamen*, at all times ready for the service, holding out to them sufficient inducements...to pursue a business attended with so much peril and hardship." 74 U.S. 53, 67 (1868). (emphasis supplied).

In *Steamship Company v. Joliffe*, 69 U.S. 450, 456 (1864), the Supreme Court held that the object of pilotage fees was "to create a body of hardy and skillful *seamen*, thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart from the port." (emphasis supplied). *Id.* at 461, 462.

The *Joliffe* Court went on to hold that there is no difference between pilots who are onboard a ship for a voyage and those local or port pilots, such as Capt. Bach, "whose employment last but a few hours, and who have no connection with any vessel except to bring it into or to take it out of port. The term "pilot" is equally applicable to [both] classes of persons..." *Id.* at 461-62.

In *Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Port of Philadelphia*, 53 U.S. (12 HOW), 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852), dealing with compulsory bar pilots, the Supreme Court held:

> Now, a pilot, so far as it respects the navigation of the vessel and that part of the voyage which is his pilotage ground, is a temporary master charged with the safety of the vessel and cargo, and the lives of those aboard, and entrusted with the command of the crew. He is not only one of the persons engaged in navigation, but he occupies a most important and responsible place among those thus engaged. If Congress has power to regulate the seamen who assist the pilot in the management of the vessel, a power never denied, we can perceive no valid reason why the pilot should be beyond the reach of the same power. It is true that according to the usages of modern commerce on the ocean, the pilot is on board only during a part of the voyage between ports of different states or between ports between the United States and foreign countries; but if he is on board for such a purpose and during so much of the voyage as to be engaged in navigation, the power to regulate in navigation extends to him while thus engaged, as clearly as if he were there to remain on board through the whole passage from port to port. *Cooley,* Ibid.

Thus, it can clearly be seen that the Supreme Court, throughout the time period prior to the enactment of the Jones Act, consistently, without exception, and without question, referred to and considered pilots, including bar pilots, to be seamen.

Furthermore, lower courts when forced to decide whether or not pilots were protected under the general maritime law came to similar conclusions.

In *Wilson v. the Ohio,* it was held that a pilot on a steamboat navigating the River Delaware is entitled to sue in admiralty for his wages. 30 Fed. Cas. 149, 150 (Case #17,825)(EDPA 1834). In *The Lud Keefer,* 51 Fed. 44 (3

CCA 1892), the Court implicitedly and explicitedly assumed that a pilot of a steam vessel is a seaman. Additionally, in the *The Mary Elizabeth,* the Circuit Court in the Southern District of Alabama held:

> A pilot, being a person employed in the navigation of a vessel, is deemed a seaman, and his claim for wages is within the admiralty jurisdiction. 24 Fed. 397 (CC SD ALA 1885).

Furthemore, although Congress did not attempt to define the word seaman in the Jones Act, it did so in 46 U.S.C. Section 10101 of the Merchants Seamen Protection Relief Act which, in pertinent part reads as follows:

> (3) Seaman means an individual (except scientific personnel, a sailing school instructor or a sailing student) engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel.

Although this provision was enacted in 1983 as part of Congress' efforts to "revise, consolidate and enact" certain laws related to vessels and seamen of sub-title II of title 46 U.S. Code. H.R. Rep. No. 338, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, Reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. & News 924. However, the legislative history of the act clearly indicates that "Section 10101 defines the terms master, seaman and owner as they apply to merchant seaman's protection and relief." H.R. Rep. No. 338, 1983 Code Cong. Admin. & News at 1004. This definition of seaman, however had its genesis in act of December 21, 1889, C.28, Sections 23, 26, R.S. Section 4612 (30 Stat. 762, 764) and was derived from an act of June 7, 1872, C.322, Section 65, 17 Stat. 277.

It is extremely interesting to note that federal laws defining and regulating pilots at 46 USCA 8501, et seq., are under the sub-title "Manning of Vessels" and not under

Title 33 where the LHWCA is found. This is another indication that Congress considers pilots masters or members of the crew of a vessel rather than land based maritime workers.

Clearly, not only did the Supreme Court and all the lower courts which had addressed the issue consider pilots to be seamen, but the definition of seaman which Congress itself has adopted clearly indicates that a pilot would fall within the purview of the term of art commonly used in effect at the time of the passage of the Jones Act.

THE LONGSHORE HARBOR WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT

However, our inquiry does not necessarily end there. Further guidance as to who is or is not a seaman can be obtained from the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (Part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. Sections 901 thru 950. As this Court wrote in *Wilander,*

> ...the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive. The LHWCA provides relief for land based maritime workers, and the Jones Act is restricted to 'master or member of a crew of any vessel': we must take it that the effect of these provisions of the LHWCA is to confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the members of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters and to substitute for the right of recovery recognized by the *Haverty* case only such rights to compensation as are given by the LHWCA. (citations omitted).
>
> 'Master or member of a crew' is a refinement of the term 'seaman' in the Jones Act; it excludes

> from LHWCA coverage those properly covered under the Jones Act. Thus, it is odd, but true that the key requirement for Jones Act coverage now appears in another statute.
>
> With the passage of the LHWCA, Congress established a clear destinction between land based and sea based maritime workers. The latter, who owe their allegiance to a vessel and not solely to a land based employer are seamen. *Wilander,* 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. at 813.

As the Jones Act and LHWCA are mutually exclusive, bar pilots must fall under either one or the other. Although it seems clear that a bar pilot's employment can only be carried out aboard a vessel in navigation and is in no way "land based," appellees urge otherwise. Therefore, we must also examine whether or not Capt. Bach and bar pilots are in fact covered under the LHWCA.

In 1927, only seven years after the passage of the Jones Act and very shortly after the adoption of the LHWCA, the United States Employees Compensation Commission, the federal agency charged with enforcing the LHWCA issued a definitive ruling that a river pilot is included within the term "master or member of a crew" and thus is not covered by the LHWCA. *Longshoremen's Act Opinion #22,* 1928 AMC 263 (U.S. Employees Comp. Comm. 1927).

The Employees Compensation Commission was specifically called upon to decide this issue. In arriving at the conclusion that bar pilots are not covered under the LHWCA, it held:

> The question submitted to the United States Employees Compensation Commission was whether or not injury to pilots boarding vessels at sea or in port came within the compensation benefits of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Act. The pilots referred to are those taken aboard a vessel for the purpose of conducting such a vessel into or out of port...it appears that the pilot merely takes over for the time being some of the duties pertaining to navigation which fall upon the master. It is concluded, therefore, that a pilot is included within the term "master or member of the crew" as that term is used in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act and that he is specifically exempted from the act. *Id.*, 1928 AMC 263, 264. (U.S. Employees Comp. Comm. 1927)

This conclusion of the Commission must be accorded substantial weight. The Supreme Court held that its findings, if there is evidence to support them, are "conclusive." *South Chicago Coal and Dock Company v. Bassett,* 309 U.S. 251, 257-58, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed 732 (1940).

THE 1972 AMENDMENTS TO THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT

However, Congress amended the act in 1972 to extend coverage to workers whose injuries occurred not only on the navigable waters of the United States, but also on adjacent land based work locations. 33 USCA 903(a) (1986). Therefore, the issue of whether the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA brought pilots under the penumbra of the act must also be addressed.

The amended act reworded the definition of "employee" to emphasize job function, expressly providing coverage for workers engaged in occupations such as longshoring, ship building, and ship repairing, and retained the 1927 acts exclusion from coverage of "a master or member or a crew of any vessel." 33 USCA 902(3)(G)[1]. Therefore, since the definition of "master and member of a crew of any vessel" was not changed it is respectfully suggested that the 1927 opinion of the U.S. Employees Compensation Commission which specifically found that a pilot was included within the class of "master or member of a crew" was in no way abjured or vitiated. It must be presumed that Congress was aware of this official interpretation when they amended the act in 1972 and failed to specifically include bar pilots among the expanded class of covered employees of the LHWCA.

The Supreme Court in *Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray*, 470 U.S. 414, 423-24, 105 S.Ct. 1421, 1427-28, 84 L.Ed. 2d 406 (1985), emphasized that Congress' most important concern in enacting the 1972 amendments was:

> ...the desire to extend coverage to longshoremen, harbor workers, and others who were injured while on piers, docks and other areas customarily used to load and unload ships or to repair or build ships, rather than while actually afloat. *Herb's Welding*, 470 U.S. at 419-20, 105 S.Ct. at 1425-26; H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,

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[1] 33 USCA Section 902(3)(G)

(3) The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and shipbreaker, but such term does not include (G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel...

Reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 4698, 4708; S. Rep. No. 92-10135, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 13 (1972).

Clearly, the work performed by bar pilots has absolutely nothing to do with loading or unloading, repairing or building ships. The only function of a bar pilot is to act as the vessel's master while the ship is underway and travelling from one port to another. His work and employment related duties can not be performed other than on navigable waters aboard vessels underway and actually in navigation.

It is clear that when the LHWCA was first enacted in 1927 that pilots were considered "masters or members of a crew." *Longshoremen's Act Op. #22,* 1928 AMC 263-264. (U.S. Employees Comp. Comm. 1927). Congress was fully aware of the jurisprudence on this point at the time of the amendment of the LHWCA in 1972. The 1972 amendment was intended to correct the anomaly under previous case law whereby a worker's eligibility for benefits under the LHWCA Act depended on which side of the shoreline he was on when he was hurt. *Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray,* supra; *Director OWCP v. Perini North River Associates,* 459 U.S. 297, (1983); *P.C. Pfeitter v. Diverson Ford,* 444 U.S. 69, (1979); *Northeastern Marine Terminal v. Caputo,* 432 U.S. 249 (1977).

The amendments did not redefine the words "master or member of the crew" nor did they specifically include bar pilots under the coverage of the act. Therefore, it is absolutely clear that pilots do not fall under the ambit of the LHWCA nor did Congress intend them to. The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA do not affect the pre-1972 meaning of "maritime employment" as to workers injured on the navigable waters of the United States. *Herb's Welding,* 470 U.S. at 424, n.10, 105 S.Ct. at 1428, n.10.

CONCLUSION

This Court in *Wilander* held that "at the time of...the passage of the Jones Act...it was only necessary that a person be employed on board a vessel in furtherance of its purpose." *Wilander,* 498 U.S. ____, 111 S. Ct. at 813. Certainly bar pilots fit that requirement.

The key to seaman status is employment related connection to a vessel in navigation. In this regard, we believe the requirement that an employee's duties must contribute to the function of a vessel to the accomplishment of its mission captures well an important requirement of seaman status...but a seaman must be doing the ship's work. *Wilander*, 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. at 817.

Since the rendering of the original opinion in this matter, *Bach v. Trident Steamship Company, Inc., et al.,* 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991), the case of *Evans v. United Arab Shipping Company,* 767 F.Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1991) has been reported. In *Evans,* supra, the exact same situation was presented, i.e., whether or not a bar pilot is a Jones Act seaman. The *Evans* Court, however, came to a considerably different conclusion than the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. After a scholarly analysis of the *Wilander,* supra, decision, and a review of prior case law dealing with pilots, the *Evans* Court specifically rejected the reasoning of the majority in *Bach v. Trident,* 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991) and held that bar pilots, although bearing no permanent connection to a vessel or fleet or vessels, are in fact seamen for purposes of the Jones Act.

From ancient times, pilots have been indispensable to maritime commerce. Even the Fifth Circuit adnowledged that *Bach's* "entire job was to perform an arch-typical seaman function, the steering of an ocean going vessel

through navigable waters; and in performing his job, Bach regularly faced many of the hazards of life on the sea and the risks created by moving vessels in navigable waters. To use a metaphor frequently employed in describing the stuff that makes a seaman, Bach's occupation was quite "salty" indeed. *Bach v. Trident Steamship Company Inc., et al.*, 920 F.2d 322 at 323 (5th Cir. 1991).

The Honorable John R. Brown, Judge, United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, in his dissent in the second *Bach* opinion said it most eloquently:

> So indispensable to an ocean going vessel under Registry in Louisiana waters is a presence of a state licensed pilot that the vessel lawfully can not move in commerce beyond a single meter without a compulsory pilot aboard as supreme command of the vessel.
>
> Such a person, the subject of Congressional action and extended treatment by the Supreme Court concerning the essential role and responsibility of a pilot, and now recognized by the Court as a seaman in the general understanding of American Maritime Law, as of the time of the 1920 enactment of the Jones Act, should end the inquiry. This historical background and the absolute indispensability of the pilot in the actual navigation and movement of the vessel, this combination of circumstances calls for at least special recognition of the unique status of this seagoing functionary. For such a pilot, the 1920 Congressional purpose to make him a seaman surely was not abandoned by its intent in the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act in 1927. *Bach v. Trident Steamship Company, et al.*, 947 Fd.2d at 1290 (5th Cir. 1991) on remand.

It is respectfully suggested that bar pilots such as

Capt. Bach were seamen at the time of the enactment of the Jones Act in 1920. They were considered a master or member of a crew at the time of the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act in 1927 and that the amendment to the LHWCA in 1972 in no way changed that status. Capt. Bach is a seaman, or at the very least, is entitled to have the issue of his seaman status decided by a jury.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
GAMBEL, CALVERT AND SMITH

BY: _____

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari has been served on Robert H. Murphy of the Law Firm of Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler and Sarpy on _____.

_____

GREGORY F. GAMBEL
MARK W. SMITH

APPENDIX A

Helen Ehret BACH, Eugene G. Bach, III, Janet B. Lashley, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-3298.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 2, 1991.

Survivors of state-required river pilot, who suffered fatal heart attack after boarding oceangoing vessel, brought action for damages. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Patrick E. Carr, J., 708 F.Supp. 776, granted summary judgment to defendants. The Court of Appeals, 920 F.2d 322, affirmed. Survivors sought certiorari review. The Supreme Court, 111 S.Ct. 2253, granted certiorari, vacated judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening Supreme Court case law. On remand, the Court of Appeals, W. Eugene Davis, Circuit Judge, held that river pilot was not seaman because he was not permanently assigned to any particular vessel or fleet of vessels.

Affirmed.

Brown, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring and dissenting.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before BROWN, JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

This cause has been remanded to us by the Supreme Court ____ U.S.____, 111 S.Ct. 2253, 114 L.Ed.2d 706, for reconsideration in light of *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander,* 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). The Court in Wilander concluded that a maritime worker need not aid in the navigation of a vessel to be a seaman. That holding, however, does not affect this court's conclusion that Bach was not a seaman. We did not base our decision on Bach's seaman status on the relationship of his duties to navigation. Indeed, this issue was never in doubt. Instead, we concluded that Bach was not a seaman because he was not permanently assigned to any particular vessel or fleet of vessels.

Because the rule announced by the Supreme Court in *Wilander* has no effect on our earlier conclusion, we reinstate our previous judgment. *Bach v. Trident S.S. Co.,* 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.1991).

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring/dissenting.

I concur with the panel that, following the granting of certiorari and vacation of the Fifth Circuit's Order of Affirmance, the Supreme Court's remand for reconsideration in light of *Wilander*[1] does not either afford an answer to our case or offer up any decisive guide to this Court. So the problem remains: is a state-required compulsory pilot aboard an ocean-going vessel a Jones Act seaman?

Consequently, I continue in my dissent to the panel's holding that such a pilot, as a manner of law, is not a Jones Act seaman.

Although *Wilander* turns out not to be the decisive guide, what it does say is of demonstrable vitality, affording undeniable support to the views I set forth so forcibly in my initial dissent.[2]

First, who is a seaman under the Jones Act? *Wilander's* answer is positive:

> The Jones Act does not define 'seaman.' Neither does The Osceola; it simply uses the term as had other admiralty courts. We assume that the Jones Act uses 'seaman' in the same way.... The Jones Act, responding directly to The Osceola, adopts without further elaboration the term used in The Osceola. Moreover, 'seaman' is a maritime term of art. In the absence of contrary indication, we assume that when a statute uses such a term, Congress intended it to have its established meaning.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ___ __ ___, 111 S.Ct. at

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[1] *McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander,* 498 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991).

[2] 920 F.2d 322, 327-33.

810-11, 112 L.Ed.2d at 874.

This led the Court as "our first task" to determine who was a seaman under the general maritime law when Congress passed the Jones Act. *Id.* 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 811, 112 L.Ed.2d at 874.

Tracing the numerous Nineteenth Century cases, broadening seaman status to many not engaged in the *navigation* of a vessel, the Court emphasized Justice Story's decision, sitting on circuit in *United States v. Thompson*, 28 F.Cas. 102 (C.C.D.Mass.1832) (No. 16,492):

> A cook and steward are seamen in the sense of the maritime law, although they have peculiar duties assigned them. So a *pilot*, a surgeon, a ship-carpenter, and a boatswain, are deemed seamen, entitled to sue in the admiralty.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 811, 112 L.Ed.2d at 875 (emphasis added).

Acknowledging it to be the leading admiralty treatise, the Court then quoted from E. Benedict, The American Admiralty § 278 at 158 (1950):

> Masters, mates, sailors, surveyors, carpenters, coopers, stewards, cooks, cabin boys, kitchen boys, engineers, *pilots*, firemen, deck hands, waiters,—women as well as men,—are mariners.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Then Judge, subsequently Justice, Brown, later the author of *The Osceola*, stated:

> [A]ll hands employed upon a vessel except the Master, are entitled to a [seaman's lien for wages] if their services are in furtherance of the main object of the enterprise in which he is engaged. *The Minna*, 11 F. 759, 760 (E.D.Mich.1882).

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 812, 112 L.Ed.2d at 876.

Quoted with approval was another ancient authority M. Cohen, Admiralty 239 (1883):

> [A]ll persons employed on a vessel to assist in the main purpose of the voyage are mariners, and included under the name of seamen.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 813, 112 L.Ed.2d at 876.

All this led the Court in *Wilander* to conclude that:

> [A]t the time of ... the passage of the Jones Act ... [i]t was only necessary that a person be employed on board a vessel in furtherance of its purpose.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 813, 112 L.Ed.2d at 877.

> The key to seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation.
>
> In this regard, we believe the requirement that an employee's duties must 'contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission' captures well an important requirement of seaman status ... but a seaman must be doing the ship's work.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 817, 112 L.Ed.2d at 882.

Declaring that at the time of *The Osceola,* maritime law did not require that a seaman aid in navigation, the Court stated:

> It was only necessary that a person be employed on board a vessel in furtherance of its purpose.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 813, 112 L.Ed.2d at 877.

The Court then concluded that:

> The Jones Act established no requirement that a seaman aid in navigation.

Wilander, 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 813, 112 L.Ed.2d at 877.

I am indebted to Judge Brotman, United States District Judge, New Jersey, for his additional historical precedents on the pre-Jones Act definition of seaman in his decision according seamen status to a compulsory pilot injured by a faulty accommodation ladder while the vessel was under-weigh. *Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co.,* 767 F.Supp. 1284 (D.N.J.1991). These include *The Mary Elizabeth,* 24 F. 397 (C.C.S.D.Ala.1885); *Wilson v. The Ohio,* 30 F.Cas. 149, 150 (C.C.E.D.Pa.1834) (No. 17,825) (pilot entitled to sue in admiralty for wages); *The Lud Keefer,* 51 F. 44 (3d Cir.1982).

Ironically, on *Wilander's* reading of *The Osceola,* holding No. 2,[3] a pilot, having a maritime lien to recover

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[3] *Wilander,* 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at 810, 112 L.Ed.2d at 873.

pilotage fees, would have a maritime lien by which to recover damages caused by an unseaworthy Jacob's ladder. But under the Fifth Circuit decision, for the very same injury caused by negligence, not unseaworthiness, there would be no recovery as a Jones Act seaman.

Demonstrating that pre-1920 pilots were seamen, my initial dissent, 920 F.2d 327, details how Congress and the Supreme Court each has authoritatively determined the critical role of a compulsory pilot and his indispensable importance in the navigation and movement of a vessel in navigation. *See Cooley v. Board of Wardens,*[4] and the enactment by Congress of August 7, 1989, permitting the continued vitality of state-compulsory pilotage laws. Much later, *see Bisso.*[5]

A fair reading of congressional actions and Supreme Court decisions support the views I emphasized:

> Pilotage has been the subject of immediate legislative concern and action; by it Congress, in recognition of the indispensability of pilots, has constitutionally authorized state laws compelling, under pain of criminal sanction, the use of state licensed pilots on vessels under Registry; the presence of a licensed pilot is so important that the law of unquestioned authority as declared by the Supreme Court holds the pilot in supreme command over master and crew so that the pilot's orders can only be countermanded in the face of obvious, glaring incompetence and neglect; the failure to have on board a compulsory

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[4] 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed.996 (1852), *Bach* dissent n. 7 and related text.

[5] *Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.*, 349 U.S. 85, 93-94, 75 S.Ct. 629, 634, 99 L.Ed.911, 919 (1955).

> pilot subjects the vessel to substantial civil liabilities.

920 F.2d at 331.

So indispensable to an ocean-going vessel under Registry in Louisiana waters[6] is the presence of a state-licensed pilot that the vessel lawfully cannot move in commerce beyond a single meter without a compulsory pilot aboard in supreme command of the vessel.

Such a person, the subject of congressional action and extended treatment by the Supreme Court concerning the essential role and responsibility of a pilot, and now recognized by the Court as a seaman in the general understanding of American maritime law, as of the time of the 1920 enactment of the Jones Act, should end the inquiry. With this historical background and the absolute indispensability of the pilot in the actual navigation and movement of the vessel, this combination of circumstances calls for at least special recognition of the unique status of this seagoing[7] functionary. For such pilot, the 1920 congressional purpose to make him a seaman surely was not abandoned by its intent in the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation

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[6] *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 34:995, 1002 (West 1985); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 34:1002.1, 1009 (West Supp.1991).

[7] A pilot is exposed to all of the perils of a seagoing member of the crew. Unlike, for example, a longshoreman handling cargo in or out of a vessel at the dock or a repairman in the confines of a shipyard, the pilot bears all the risks of those who put to sea, fire or explosion following a collision, collapse or failure of a Jacob's ladder while the vessel is under weigh or the like.

As *Evans, supra*, reflects, the pilot, as customary, was disembarking while the vessel was under weigh. In many harbors the pilot joins or leaves the vessel in the offshore sea.

Act[8] (LHWCA) in 1927.

I must continue in my dissent.[9]

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[8] The Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA) of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 *et seq.*, explicitly excludes from coverage, "a Master or member of a crew of any vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1986).

[9] If Iam correct that this time-honored, exclusively maritime functionary is, and always has been, an indispensable member of the ship's company and thereby covered by the Jones Act, the contention that, by Part III, 920 F.2d 333, I agree there is insufficient proof of negligence and causatioin is not supportable in light of *Fegruson v. Moore McCormack Lines*, 352 U.S. 521, 523, 77 S.Ct. 457, 458, 1 L.Ed.2d 511 (1957) quoting *Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.*, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), and this Court's frequent characterization that the Jones Act standard of negligence and causation is "*featherweight.*" *See, e.g., Smith v. Trans-World Drilling Co.*, 772 F.2d 157, 162 (5th Cir.1985); *Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Services, Inc.*, 764 F.2d 300, 304-05 (5th Cir.1985); *Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.*, 731 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1984) and GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, p. 377 (2d Ed.1975).

APPENDIX B

Helen Ehret BACH, Eugene G. Bach, III, Janet B. Lashley,
Petitioners,

v.

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., et al.
No. 90-1578

Case below, 708 F.Supp. 776; 920 F.2d 322.

June 3, 1991. On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander*, 498 U.S. ____, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991).

APPENDIX C

Helen Ehret BACH, Eugene G. Bach, III,
Janet B. Lashley,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-3298.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 10, 1991.

Survivors of compulsory river pilot, who suffered fatal heart attack after boarding vessel, brought action for damages. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Patrick E. Carr, J., 708 F.Supp. 776, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, W. Eugene Davis, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) pilot was not "seaman" for purposes of Jones Act, and (2) survivors could not maintain negligence action under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

Affirmed.

Brown, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before BROWN, JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

The survivors of Eugene G. Bach, Jr. appeal the summary judgment dismissal of their claims made under the Jones Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and the general maritime law. 708 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.La.1989). We affirm.

I. FACTS

On December 26, 1986, Eugene G. Bach, Jr. came aboard the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT to serve as its compulsory river pilot between New Orleans and Pilottown, near the mouth of the Mississippi River. Bach arrived alongside the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT in a small pilot boat and ascended a pilot ladder to the ship's deck. Although Bach arrived safely on the bridge, he collapsed from a heart attack a few minutes later. The crew summoned medical help from shore, but no one attempted to aid Bach although several had been trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation techniques.

Bach's survivors brought suit under the Jones Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and the general maritime law. All of their theories centered upon the adequacy of the pilot ladder and the failure of the crew of the vessel to render medical aid to Bach. The trial judge dismissed their claims, and this appeal followed.

II. JONES ACT

[1] Only a "seaman" may assert a negligence action under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C.App. §688.[1] An injured

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[1] Because we decide that Bach is not a seaman, we need not consider whether Trident Steamship Inc. Company was his employer for purposes of the Jones Act.

worker attains seaman status by proving: (i) permanent attachment to or substantial work on a vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels and; (ii) contribution to the function or mission of the vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels. *Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 781 F.2d 1067, 1072-74 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc); *Offshore Co. v. Robison*, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir.1959).

[2] Bach's survivors do not seriously argue that he was permanently attached to or did substantial work on board the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT. The record clearly reveals that he fulfilled neither requirement. His transitory work aboard the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT, which lacked any degree of regularity and continuity, does not constitute either permanent attachment to or substantial work aboard that vessel. See *Barrett*, 781 F.2d 1073-74.

Bach's survivors argue that he is not required to establish a connection to the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT because he can prove the requisite connection to a "fleet" of vessels that includes the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT. See *Barrett*, 781 F.2d at 1074; *Braniff v. Jackson Ave.—Gretna Ferry, Inc.*, 280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.1960). In *Barrett*, we defined "fleet" for these purposes as an "identifiable group of vessels acting together or under one control." *Barrett*, 781 F.2d at 1074. The only apparent connection between the vessels Bach piloted was that they traversed a stretch of the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Pilottown. Ordinarily, this would hardly constitute a fleet. But Bach's survivors contend that because each vessel he worked aboard was under his control when he piloted it, the aggregation of the vessels he worked aboard constitutes a fleet.

We made it clear in *Barrett* that "fleet" means more than simply "any group of vessels an employee happens to

work aboard." 781 F.2d at 1074. Bach's "control" argument is no more than an attempt to make a "fleet" out of all the vessels he worked aboard. *Barrett's* definition and explanation of "fleet" forecloses this argument. This group of vessels is not a "fleet."

[3] While Bach fails the vessel connection prong of the *Robison-Barrett* test, we have specifically reserved decision on whether an exception to that test might be made in a case such as Bach's:

> We do not decide whether the same principle governs the crewmember status of the maritime worker who spends virtually all of his time performing traditional seaman's duties—work closely related to the movement of vessels—but does his work on short voyages aboard a large number of vessels.

Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1075 n. 13. The question we reserved in *Barrett* faces us today. In particular, we must decide whether to exempt workers who perform traditional seaman's work on a large number of unconnected vessels from the vessel connection prong of our test for seaman status.

Bach's case for seaman status has considerable intuitive appeal for two reasons: (i) his entire job was to perform an arche-typical seaman function, the steering of an oceangoing vessel through navigable waters; and (ii) in performing his job, Bach regularly faced many of the hazards of life on the sea and the risks created by moving vessels through navigable waters. To use a metaphor frequently employed in describing the stuff that makes a seaman, Bach's occupation was quite "salty" indeed.

Although some of our seaman status cases discuss the perils of the sea that the worker faces, we have never held that seaman status is coextensive with exposure to seaman's risks. We have frequently refused to extend seaman's protections to workers exposed to a seaman's perils but who lacked the requisite connection to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. See *Ardleigh v. Schlumberger Ltd.*, 832 F.2d 933, 934 (5th Cir.1987) (employee who worked offshore on thirty unconnected vessels denied seaman status); *Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc.*, 831 F.2d 554, 555-56 (5th Cir.1987) (worker who spent seventy-five to eighty percent of his working time aboard unconnected moveable drilling rigs not a seaman); *Langston v. Schlumberger Offshore Services, Inc.*, 809 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir.1987) (worker who performed work on fifteen vessels belonging to ten different owners not a seaman). We have also refused to extend seaman status to a variety of workers who undeniably faced the perils of the sea but who worked on a structure that did not qualify as a "vessel." See *Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton*, 788 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 278, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986) (ship on sea trials not a vessel "in navigation," and therefore those working aboard ship during sea trials not seamen); *Reeves v. Offshore Logistics, Inc.*, 720 F.2d 835, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1983) (helicopter not a vessel and therefore offshore helicopter pilot not a seaman).

Similarly, we have not granted seaman status to workers who performed the work usually or traditionally done by seamen but who lacked connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels. To the contrary, we have always required those workers performing traditional maritime functions to satisfy the vessel connection test. In *Fazio v. Lykes S.S. Co., Inc.*, 567 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1978), we denied seaman status to a shoregang worker who performed traditional

seaman's work but who lacked the requisite vessel connection. Similarly, in *White v. Valley Line Co.*, 736 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984), we refused to grant seaman status to an injured fleetman at a barge fleeting facility who spent almost all of his time aboard various barges doing seaman-type work—handling tow lines, and cleaning and repairing barges—but who could not show connection to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. Thus, to grant Bach an exemption from establishing connection to a particular vessel or fleet of vessels would be inconsistent with a long list of cases from this court.

Granting Bach an exception to the vessel connection requirement would also draw us farther away from other circuits. Although *Robison* and *Barrett* only require the worker to establish that he aided in the accomplishment of the mission of the vessel, several other circuits adhere to the narrower "aid in navigation" test or a similarly stringent requirement. *See Stanfield v. Shellmaker, Inc.*, 869 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.1989); *Johnson v. John F. Beasley Const. Co.*, 742 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (7th Cir.1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S.Ct. 1180, 84 L.Ed.2d 328 (1985); *Simko v. C & C Maintenance Co.*, 594 F.2d 960, 964-65 (3rd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 64, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979); *Whittington v. Sewer Const. Co.*, 541 F.2d 427, 436 (4th Cir.1976). To further weaken our test by excusing workers engaged in traditional maritime work from establishing vessel connection would only widen the gap between this court and most other circuits in the proof required to establish seaman status.[2]

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[2] We note that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one of our Jones Act seaman cases, apparently to resolve this conflict among the circuits. *See Wilander v. McDermott Intern, Inc.*, 887 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.1989), *cert. granted in part*, ____ U.S. ____, 110 S.Ct. 3212, 110 L.Ed.2d 660 (1990).

Further, such an exception for workers engaged in traditional maritime work would be difficult to apply and would unnecessarily inject uncertainty and ambiguity in our circuit's test for seaman status. For example, would harborworkers, particularly those engaged in occupations not enumerated in the Act[3] who perform essential vessel functions traditionally performed by the crew and who sometimes face seaman-type risks, be entitled to have a jury ponder whether they are seamen? For over thirty years, this circuit has struggled to provide a workable test for distinguishing seamen from other maritime workers in maritime injury cases. A large body of law, developed through a case-by-case application of the *Robison* test, provides the means for deciding which workers are entitled to the benefits of the Jones Act. Dozens (perhaps hundreds) of seaman status cases have come before us, but we have never made an exception to the core requirement that the injured worker show attachment to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. We decline the invitation now to make a wholesale exception to a test that has served us for so long.

In short, to create an exception for a worker such as Bach who has the duties and faces the risks of a traditional seaman but who lacks requisite vessel connection would include all sorts of workers we have previously excluded, would widen the divergence of views between our circuit and others, and would make our seaman test unnecessarily uncertain and ambiguous. We therefore decline to make such a radical change in this circuit's test for Jones Act coverage. The district court correctly determined that no genuine issue of fact remained and that Bach was not a seaman as a matter of law.

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[3] See *Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp.*, 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.1987), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S.Ct. 1013, 98 L.Ed.2d 978 (1988).

III. OTHER MARITIME REMEDIES

A. Section 905(b) of the LHWCA

Bach's survivors also assert a negligence action against Trident Steamships under section 905(b) of the LWHCA. They make two arguments: (i) that the crew and owners of the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT negligently provided a substandard boarding ladder; and (ii) that the crew of the TRIDENT were negligent in failing to administer cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to him after his heart attack.

1. Adequacy of the Boarding Ladder

[4] Bach's survivors assert that the crew was negligent because it failed to provide him with an appropriate means of boarding the ship. They rely on two regulations concerning pilot ladders. The two regulations—one a part of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and a nearly identical Coast Guard regulation—require that when the distance from the water to the ship's deck exceeds thirty feet, "access from a pilot ladder to the [vessel or ship] must be by way of an accommodation ladder" or by an "equally safe and convenient means." Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 1974, Multilateral, Ch. 5, Regulation 17(a)(ii), 32 U.S.T. 47, 243, TIAS No. 9700, reprinted at 6B Benedict on Admiralty, doc. 14-8, at 14-400; 46 C.F.R. 96.40-1(g). The SOLAS regulation also requires a pilot ladder to be secured so that "the pilot can gain safe and convenient access to the ship after climbing . . . not more than 9 metres (30 feet)."

Bach's survivors point out that the free-board of the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT was approximately thirty-two feet and that no accommodation ladder or similar device

was provided for Bach's ascent. Therefore, they contend, both the SOLAS regulation and the Coast Guard regulation were violated.

We conclude that these regulations were not violated. The regulations do not prohibit pilot ladders more than thirty feet in length; nor do they prevent the use of a pilot ladder when the vessel's freeboard exceeds thirty feet. The obvious intention of these regulations is to limit to thirty feet the distance a pilot can be required to climb a pilot ladder. It is only after the pilot has climbed thirty feet of pilot ladder that an accommodation ladder or other similar device is required.

It is undisputed that Bach began his ascent of the pilot ladder at least eleven feet above the water level. Bach therefore climbed considerably less than thirty feet on that ladder. Because Bach was required to climb less than thirty feet on the pilot ladder, no accommodation ladder or other device was required. Hence, Bach's section 905(b) claim based on violation of these regulations fails.

2. Failure of the crew to administer CPR

[5] Bach also asserts a negligence claim based on the failure of the crew to administer CPR to him. Undisputed medical testimony indicates that Bach had no more than a fifteen percent chance of surviving even if the crew had rendered CPR and electrical defibrillation had been available. From this uncontradicted evidence, no rational factfinder could conclude that the crew's failure to administer CPR more likely than not caused Bach's death. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts section 41, at 269 (5th Ed.2984) ("plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant

was a cause in fact of the result"); Re-statement (Second) Torts sections 431, 433 comment b (1965).

Bach's survivors seek to avoid this factual weakness by urging this court to adopt a special rule of causation, the "loss of a chance of survival" doctrine. Under this doctrine, which as far as we can tell, has been confined to medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs who cannot meet the ordinary standards of causation are allowed to recover for negligent conduct that decreases their chances of survival. See generally Annotation, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance Causality," 54 ALR 4th 10 (1987).[4]

We decline the invitation to apply this doctrine in this section 905(b) case, well beyond the context in which it has been developed.

Bach has therefore failed to prove causation and failed to persuade us to adopt the loss of a chance of survival doctrine. He therefore may not recover in negligence for the failure of the crew to administer CPR.

B. Unseaworthiness

[6] Bach's survivors contend that they may bring an unseaworthiness action based on the "*Sieracki*"seaman doctrine. See *Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki*, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). The *Sieracki* doctrine sur-

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[4] Bach's survivors also rely on *Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.*, 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.1962), *cert. denied*, 372 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 728, 9 L.Ed.2d 721 (1963), in which the Fourth Circuit discussed the duty to attempt rescue of an overboard Jones Act seaman. We read *Gardner* as enforcing a special duty imposed by the Jones Act. Because Bach is not a Jones Act seaman, that special duty has no relevance.

vives only in favor of maritime workers who are not covered by the LHWCA. See *Aparicio v. Swan Lake,* 643 F.2d 1109, 1118 (5th Cir.1981). However, the record before us does not clearly reveal whether Bach was an LHWCA-covered worker.[5] We therefore address his claim on the merits.

Unfortunately for Bach's survivors, this claim is nothing more than their negligence claim recast in terms of the warranty of seaworthiness. They assert that the vessel was unseaworthy because it did not have the type of ladder prescribed by SOLAS and Coast Guard regulations. As we have already noted, undisputed summary judgment evidence shows there was no violation. Hence, the unseaworthiness claim must fail as well.

AFFIRMED.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Disregarding nearly a thousand years of maritime lore, enactments and codes of worldwide maritime nations, congressional enactments and Supreme Court decisions, the Court holds that a state compulsory pilot—the preeminent, indispensable member of the ship's company in controlling and directing the immediate navigation of a vessel—is not a statutory Jones Act[1] seaman.

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[5] The LHWCA covers those "engaged in maritime employment." 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903. The record does not clearly show that Bach was the employee of anyone. It is, therefore, unclear whether the LHWCA covered him.

1. 46 U.S.C. App. § 688:

> Recovery for injury to or death of seaman (a) Application of railway employee statutes; jurisdiction

I cannot turn my back on this maritime tradition and compelling precedent. I am compelled to dissent.[2]

I.

The Pilot—A Hoary Figure

Dependent as the nation is, in large part, on the rich history and traditions of maritime law as it has been developed over the centuries amongst maritime nations in the aim generally for some universal, worldwide application, the maritime lore has exceeding importance.

Amongst the most ancient and venerable are the Rules of Oleron[3] to which the reknowned expositors of maritime law, ancient and contemporary, Gilmore and Black,[4] remind us that the rules have "always been regarded as having an especial importance for the maritime law of England, and hence for that of the United States. . . . [O]nce in a while, when more recent authority fails, a court may look back to them, and especially to the Rules of

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(Footnote 1 continued)

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may . . . maintain an action for damages . . . with the right of trial by jury, and in such action . . . [Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., shall apply]

2. As set forth in part III I concur in the balance of the Court's opinion.

3. *See* Peters, Admiralty Decisions in the District Court of the United States for the Pennsylvania District (1807), Appendix to Vol. I, lxvii-xc (reprinted in 30 F.Cas. 1171). See also, GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, p. 7, n. 22 (2d Ed.1975) [hereafter G & B].

4. G & B, *supra* n. 3, at 6-7, nn. 20-22.

Oleron, for what analogical help may be vouchsafed."[5]

Although Gilmore and Black emphasize that "the most interesting of all these medieval maritime codifications . . . is . . . the Rules of Oleron,"[6] the Supreme Court did not confine itself so narrowly. In the really landmark case of *Cooley v. Board of Wardens*[7]—a case which resurrects vivid recollections in every lawyer, teacher, and judge as students of constitutional law—the Court had to determine and upheld the constitutionality of the Act of 7th of August 1789, § 4.[8]

The Court in what might have been frowned on by scholars, law review editors and those beholden to Blue and White books, referred specifically to

> [n]umerous laws of this kind . . . cited in the learned argument of the counsel for the defendant in error; and their fitness, as a part of a system of pilotage, in many places, may be inferred from their existence in so many different states and

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5. *Id.* at 7. *See also,* BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY (7th Ed.1989) [hereafter BENEDICT], Laws of Oleron, § 6, p. 1-21, n. 1. BENEDICT summarizes Zouch's six-part general classification of the Rules of Oleron:

> 6. Touching the charge for hiring pilots, and their duty.

Id. at § 27, p. 2-6.

6. G & B, *supra* n. 3, at 6-7.

7. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852).

8. Quoted in 53 U.S. at 317, 13 L.Ed. at 1004:

"That all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States, shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States, respectively, wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the States may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress." (Codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 8501(a).)

and countries.[9]

Laws of Oleron are Exacting as to Pilots

Whatever the authenticity of the author, Eleanor of Aquitaine, mother of Richard the Lionhearted, or the actions of Eleanor in the Holy Land,[10] Article XXIII is graphic, not only in the implication that a pilot must be aboard for voyages through localized waters, but in the seriousness of the pilot's occupation which holds him

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9. 53 U.S. at 312, 13 L.Ed. at 1002. As did the Supreme Court, I accept without further documentary authentication these ancient codes as listed in excerpts from counsel's briefs:

> I. European. 1st Hanseatic Ordinances (about A.D. 1457), ch. 25. Captain to take pilot under penalty (amende) of one mark of gold. II. 486. 2d. Maritime Law of Sweden (about A.D. 1500). Captain to take a pilot, and if he neglects to do so, shall pay one hundred and fifty thalers, one third to the informer, one third to the sufferer (plaignans) or pilot offering, and one third to the poor mariners. Cap. 7, III. 172. 3d. Maritime Law of Du Pays Bas. Captain to take pilot, under penalty of fifty reals, and be responsible for any loss to the vessel. Cap. 24, tit. 9, IV, 83. 4th Maritime Law of France. Ordinances Louis XIV. A.D. 1681, ch. 26. If the mariners refuse a pilot, they shall suffer corporal punishment, and the one who tenders himself must be employed. And provides also for the examination of pilots by competent persons. IV. 395. Moreover, they who are engaged in navigating royal vessels into ports or rivers have not the option of taking or refusing a pilot; in the same case merchant vessels are required to take pilots, under the penalty of fifty livres, to be applied to the Marine Hospital, and the repairing of any damage from stranding. Art. 5, tit. 1, livre II. Ordinance of April, 1689; *see* Repertoire de Jurisprudence, tome 9, p. 236.

53 U.S. at 308, 13 L.Ed. at 1000.

10. G & B, *supra* n. 3, at 7, n. 23. Compare BENEDICT, *supra* n. 5, § 26 at 2-5 to 2-6, which states that the Rules of Oleron were:

> "...made by Richard the I [the Lionhearted], King of England, on his return from the Holy Land ... for the better regulation of *merchants, owners, and of ships, and mariners, and all seafaring persons in maritime affairs.*"

of the consequences of his dereliction as pilot including, if his purse is not adequate, the loss of his head:

Art. XXIII

If a pilot undertakes the conduct of a vessel, to bring her to St. Malo, or any other port and fail of his duty therein, so as the vessel miscarry by reason of his ignorance in what he undertook, and the merchants sustain damage thereby, he shall be obliged to make full satisfaction for the same, if he hath wherewithal; and if not, lose his head.[11]

Who is a Pilot?

Here I am dealing primarily with those localized persons who come aboard the ship to assure successful navigation of the vessel through the local shoals, eddies, sandbars, influence of localized tides, wind, currents and the ever-growing industrial installations emerging from the commercial developments of the area. I am not dealing with those described as "pilots" who are permanently aboard the vessel.[12]

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11. Rules of Oleron, *supra* n. 3, 30 F. Cas. at 1180. Art. XXIV requires a pre-lethal protection to the errant pilot since the imminence of loss of his head made it important that the pilot "must be sure he had not wherewith to make satisfaction." *Id.* at 1180-81.

12. The Observation on Arts. XXIII and XXIV, Rules of Oleron, the authorship of which is unknown, points out:

> Observation on the Two Foregoing Articles.
>
> The original calls these pilots "locmen"; for when those laws were written, there were officers aboard all ships, called pilots, who went the whole voyage, whereas the locmen were like our pilots, mariners hired at every river to guide the ship; for, dwelling on the place, the locmen was supposed to know the shore better than the ship's pilot, who perhaps was never there before; for which reason he commonly required the master to have a locmen, to avoid rocks, shelves, shoals and sands, which he must be well

All Agree Role of Pilot is Clear

One of the most authoritative resumes is that of D. Bederman's article on Compulsory Pilotage.[13] He states:

> For as long as men have taken to the sea, pilots have guided their journeys. Pilots were known to antiquity, and rules for their conduct were provided as early as Roman times and the Middle Ages. The first instance of mandatory pilotage was probably made in the ordonances de Wisbuy ... propounded ... in the twelfth century.
>
> The rationale for compulsory pilotage is straightforward enough. Navigation in and out of ports and harbors, and within restricted waters, poses special hazards that are not presented when sailing on the high seas. . . . Foreign vessels that are unfilmiliar with local conditions require a navigator skilled and knowledgeable in those ways.[14]

(Footnote 12 continued)

> acquainted with by long using the river: that of Roan is very dangerous on this account, and there are sworn pilots every two leagues to guide ships up the Seine. They are very necessary all over Brittany. The forty-fourth and fifty-nineth articles of the Ordinances of Wisbuy, oblige the master to take a new pilot, if his own and the ship's crew demand one of him. The master finds him maintenance, and the merchant pays him, by the sixtieth article of the Ordinances of Wisbuy. The loss of the pilot's head, if through his ignorance or negligence the ship is lost, is taken from the Consolato, c.250,—and answers to that known maxim in the law, 'Qui non habet in aere, luet in corpore.'

Rules of Oleron, *supra* n. 3, 30 F.Cas. at 1181.

13. Bederman, *Compulsory Pilotage, Public Policy, and the Early Private International Law of Torts*, 64 Tul.L.Rev. 1033 (1990) [hereafter, Compulsory Pilotage]; *see id.* at 1041 n. 21.

14. *Id.* at 1041-42 (footnotes omitted).

Congress Has Legislated on Pilots

Congress in its very first year was both conscious of the system of state-imposed compulsory pilotage and the need for the national government to permit the continuation of this system when it adopted the Act of August 7, 1789.[15]

By this Act Congress recognized the applicability of state compulsory pilotage statutes until Congress legislated specifically. It did so when Congress passed the Act of 2d of March 1837[16] restricting the rights of adjoining states by authorizing the master to accept a pilot certificated by any of the adjacent states.

Supreme Court Spoken Often, Consistently on Pilots

The Court first spoke in *Cooley* upholding the constitutionality of the Act of 1789.[17]

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15. *See supra* n. 8. This was the subject of *Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra* n. 7.

16. Quoted in *Cooley, supra* n. 7, 53 U.S. at 317, 13 L.Ed. at 1004.

> "That it shall and may he lawful for the master or commander of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon waters which are the boundary between two states, to employ any pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of either of the states bounded on the said waters, to any law, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding."

(Codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 8501(b).)

17. And when we look to the nature of the service performed by pilots, to the relations which that service and its compensations bear to navigation between the several States, and between the ports of the United States, and foreign countries, we are brought to the conclusion, that the regulation of the qualifications of pilots, of the modes and times of offering and rendering their services, of the responsibilities which shall rest upon them, of the powers they shall possess, of the compensation they may demand, and of the penalties by which their rights and duties may be enforced, do constitute regulations of navigation, and consequently of commerce, within the just meaning of this clause of the Constitution. *Id.* at 316, 13 L.Ed. at 1003.

The Court was emphatic that it realized both the importance of state-imposed compulsory pilots and their importance to the free flow of commerce:

> Now, a pilot, so far as respects the navigation of the vessel in that part of the voyage which is his pilotage ground, *is the temporary master charged with the safety of the vessel* and cargo, and of the lives of those on board, and intrusted with the command of the crew. He is not only one of the persons engaged in navigation, but he occupies most important and responsible place among those thus engaged.[18]

Though engaged and on board only temporarily, the pilot is supreme in his sphere:

> It is true that, according to the usages of modern commerce on the ocean, the pilot is on board only during a part of the voyage between ports of different states, or between ports of the United States and foreign countries; but if he is on board for such a purpose and during so much of the voyage as to be engaged in navigation, the power to regulate navigation extends to *him while thus engaged,* as *clearly as it would if he were to remain on board throughout the whole passage,* from port to port.[19]

Even more recently the Court in *Bisso* gives contemporary vitality to these propositions:

> Pilots hold a unique position in the maritime world and have been regulated extensively both by the States and Federal Government. . . . Under law and

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18. *Id.* (emphasis added).

19. *Id.* at 316, 13 L.Ed. at 1003-04 (emphasis added).

custom they have an independence wholly incompatible with the general obligations of obedience normally owed by an employee to his employer. . . . As a rule, *no employer, no person can tell them how to perform their pilotage duties.* When the law does not prescribe their duties, pilots are usually free to act on their own best judgment while engaged in piloting a vessel.[20]

Then came actions beginning with the Act of 1852,[21] culminating in the Act of 1871 and 1873.[22] By these actions Congress legislated that all coastwise vessels, be piloted by a federally licensed pilot, and free from state compulsory piloting statutes in the coastwise trade. Continued application of state compulsory pilotage laws for vessels under Registry[23] touching or engaging in commerce at a foreign port was mandated.

Legal Rights of Pilots and Consequences of Pilot Negligence

To stimulate compliance with the constitutionally upheld local compulsory pilotage laws, "another tack was adopted. Vessels entering or leaving a port were required to pay a pilotage fee whether the shipmaster accepted a pilot

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20. *Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.*, 349 U.S. 85, 93-94, 75 S.Ct. 629, 634, 99 L.Ed. 911, 919 (1955) (emphasis added).

21. Act of Aug. 30, 1852, chap. 106 (10 Stat. 61), cited in *Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co.*, 225 U.S. 187, 196, 32 S.Ct. 626, 629, 56 L.Ed. 1047, 1052 (1912), pertained not to harbor pilots, but to those entitled such and serving continuously on board as a part of the ship's company.

22. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, chap. 100 (16 Stat. 440); Act of Dec. 1, 1873, 52 R.S. §§ 4401, 4444, U.S.Comp.Stat.1901, pp. 3016, 3037; cited in *Anderson*, 225 U.S. at 190-94, 197, 32 S.Ct. at 627-28, 56 L.Ed. at 1048-49, 1052.

23. Vessels in foreign trade, i.e., between or touching foreign ports, must be Registered. Those in the coastwise trade (not including via the Panama Canal) are Enrolled or Licensed. *Id.* at 199, 32 S.Ct. at 630, 56 L.Ed. at 1053.

or not."[24] Not only does the pilot have a lien *in rem* for pilotage services, and also for tendered but refused services,[25] *The China*[26] holds the ship liable *in rem* although not *in personam*[27] for pilot errors.

Equally demanding is the holding that failure to take a compulsory pilot renders the vessel unseaworthy in a cargo damage case.[28]

II.

A Pilot is a Jones Act Seaman

Thus we have seen: Pilotage has been the subject of immediate legislative concern and action; by it Congress, in recognition of the indispensability of pilots, has constitutionally authorized state laws compelling, under pain of criminal sanction, the use of state licensed pilots on vessels under Registry; the presence of a licensed pilot is so important that the law of unquestioned authority as declared by the Supreme Court holds the pilot in supreme command over master and crew so that the pilot's orders can only be countermanded in the face of obvious, glaring incompetence and neglect; the failure to have on board a com-

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24. *Compulsory pilotage, supra* n. 13 at 1043 and n. 29 (referring to *Ex parte McNiel,* 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 236, 279, 20 L.Ed. 624 (1871) (1681 Ordinance of Louis XIV penalized such a violation with corporal punishment)).

25. *Anderson, supra* n. 21 (negligence of a compulsory pilot gives rise to a maritime lien against the offending vessel).

26. 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 53, 19 L.Ed. 67 (1868) (holding vessel liable *in rem* for negligence of compulsory pilot); and *see, Compulsory Pilotage, supra* n. 13, at 1058 n. 111, and 1059.

27. *See* G & B, *supra* n. 3, at 599 n. 25, and accompanying text (citing *Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,* 182 U.S. 406, 21 S.Ct. 831, 42 L.Ed. 1155 (1901)); and *id.* at 520 nn. 133-36, and accompanying text.

The harshness of this result is ameliorated by the Extension Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. App. & 740; *see* G & B, *supra* n. 3, at 523 n. 151.

28. *The Framlington Court,* 69 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir.1934).

pulsory pilot subjects the vessel to substantial civil liabilities.

In the face of these formidable factors, it is simply inconceivable that Congress, in that era (1915-1920) of its striving to afford effective statutory relief to all maritime workers, would exclude from the broad term "seaman" one so vital, so indispensable, so legislatively recognized as a compulsory pilot.

The Jones Act in its fullest state[29] extends its protection to seamen. Nowhere does the Act define who are *seamen.* Elsewhere Congress defines seaman in broad terms:

> (3) "seaman" means an individual (except scientific personnel, a sailing school instructor, or a sailing school student) engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel.

46 U.S.C. § 10101.[30]

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29. 46 U.S.C.App. § 688:

(a) Application of railway employee statutes; jurisdiction

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such action shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.

. . . . .

(Amendments 1982 not applicable.)

30. This definition had its genesis in Act of Dec. 21, 1898, c. 28, §§ 23, 26, R.S. § 4612 (30 Stat. 762, 764)(codified prior to reenactment at § 10101 at 46 U.S.C.App. § 713), and was derived from Act of June 7, 1872, c. 322, § 65, 17 Stat. 277.

The legislative history of the Jones Act is scarce indeed. All that appears has to do with venue provisions.[31]

Beginning its efforts in 1915, Congress enacted an omnibus statute which in the eyes of *Gilmore and Black* was a patent misreading of *The Osceola's*[32] emphasis on the fellow servant doctrine. Playing tit for tat the Court in *Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.*[33] held the 1915 Act ineffective for not having legislatively ordained *respondeat superior.*

Certainly the Supreme Court has given the Jones Act the broadest sweep.[34] To begin with there is *International Stevedoring Company v. Haverty*[35] in which Justice Holmes, in his "words are flexible" approach held

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31. *See Brown v. C.D. Mallory & Co. et al.*, 122 F.2d 98, 102 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1941) (en banc):

> The controversial sentence of Section 20 was added as a result of the action of a conference committee of the Senate and House of Representatives. See 59 Cong. Record, Part 7, p. 7044, and House Report 1093, 66th Congress, 2nd Session. In the "Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House", p. 35 of the report just mentioned, appears the following in respect to the amendment, "This amendment amends Section 20 of the seaman's act so as to extend the Federal Employers' Liability Act to cases of personal injury to or death of seamen. The House recedes with an amendment that jurisdiction of all actions brought under the provisions of Section 20 shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located." We can find no reference in the debates of either House to the statute under consideration. It seems to have been dealt with entirely in committee. The language of the report, however, is really no broader than that of the statute.

32. 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903).

33. 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171 (1918).

34. *See* G & B, *supra* n. 3, at 325-33.

35. 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157 (1926).

a longshoreman to be a Jones Act seaman. So the Court did in *Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp.*;[36] *Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.*;[37] *Butler v. Whiteman*;[38] and *Gianfala v. Texas Co.*[39]

Within six months of the *Haverty* decision Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers Compensation Act (LHWCA),[40] which extended compensation benefits to all maritime workers except masters and "members of a crew of [a] vessel." The Court in *Swanson v. Marra Bros.*[41] held "the effect of these [LHWCA] provisions is to confine the benefits of the Jones Act to members of the crew of a vessel plying navigable waters."

This has given rise to frequent expressions capsulated in Judge Rubin's opinion for us, *Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc.*[42] that the terms "seaman" and "member of a crew" are now used interchangeably.

But considering the indispensable nature of the calling of a compulsory state pilot, the interchange of "seaman" and master and "member of a crew of a vessel" ought not to cut off a pilot from being under the congres-

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36. 352 U.S. 370, 77 S.Ct. 415, 1 L.Ed.2d 404 (1957).

37. 356 U.S. 252, 78 S.Ct. 687, 2 L.Ed.2d 737 (1958).

38. 356 U.S. 271, 78 S.Ct. 734, 2 L.Ed.2d 754 (1958).

39. 350 U.S. 879, 76 S.Ct. 141, 100 L.Ed. 775 (1955).

40. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 *et seq.*

42. 614 F.2d 447, 452, n.2.
The term "seaman" is contained in the original Jones Act enacted in 1920. In 1927 Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 *et seq.*, which extended to all maritime workers except masters or "members of a crew of [a] vessel." *Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc.*, 328 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045 (1946). The terms "seaman" and "members of a crew" are now used interchangeably.

sional contemplation of seaman in 1920. A pilot is no stranger to navigation and operation of an ocean-going vessel. A pilot is not one incidental to the maintenance of maritime commerce in the *Executive Jet*[43] or world-wide operational sense. Indeed his/her work is the very essence of maritime commerce.

Certainly a pilot is a full-fledged member of the ship's company. And looking at it from 1920 and 1927 viewpoints, Congress did not mean to exclude from the protection of the Jones Act compulsory pilots while aboard and directing the navigation of a vessel. Nor does my analysis ignore or disparage Judge Wisdom's creative contribution of *Robison*[44] leading principally to the en banc in *Barrett*,[45] nor its insistence upon some more or less permanent relation to a vessel or identified group of vessels. *Robison* was borne principally out of that great class of non-descript floating craft and myraid operations in the exploration and development of off-shore oil activities.

A compulsory pilot is in no sense comparable to those incidentally related to a vessel. Such pilot is indispensable. The vessel may not operate without him/her. That pilot is in supreme command of the basic function of the vessel—to navigate in maritime commerce. That person is a seaman or he/she is nothing.

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43. *Executive Jet Avaiation v. City of Cleveland, Ohio*, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972); *see also, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson*, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982).

44. *Offshore Co. v. Robison*, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).

45. *Barrett v. Chevron*, 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), now the subject of review in the pending grant of certiorari in *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander*, 887 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1989), *cert granted*, — U.S —, 110 S.Ct. 3212, 110 L.Ed.2d 660 (1990).

III.

In Agreement With Court's Other Holdings

I agree there is no § 903(b) negligence liability in the boarding ladder, failing to administer resuscitations or on *Sieracki* unseaworthiness.

My dissent ends as it began: the unjustifiable exclusion of a state compulsory pilot as a Jones Act seaman.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Filed Oct 18 1988

HELEN BACH, ET AL. — Civil Action

VERSUS — No. 87-5900

TRIDENT SHIPPING CO., INC., ET AL. — Section "J"

Order and Reasons

CARR, J.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on Wednesday, October 12, 1988 on defendants' motion for [partial] summary judgment [to dismiss plaintiffs' Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims]. At the hearing, the Court GRANTED the motion; the Court now gives written reasons for its ruling.

Apparently, no court in this Circuit has yet addressed whether the Jones Act or the general maritime warranty of seaworthiness applies to compulsory river pilots on the Mississippi River. Today, this Court holds that neither applies to such persons.

I.

Plaintiffs are the wife and surviving children of decedent, Eugene Bach Jr., who allegedly suffered a fatal heart attack on December 26, 1986 aboard the M/V

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JAYMAT TRIDENT, which was owned and operated by defendent Trident Shipping Co., Inc. and under a voyage charter to defendant Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp.

Decedent was self-incorporated, was a member (a general partner, according to his tax return) of the Crescent River Port Pilots' Association, and was the compulsory pilot the Association assigned to navigate the JAYMAT TRIDENT downriver from New Orleans to Pilot Town. According to the deposition of decedent's son, who is also a river pilot, decedent was *not* a member of the JAYMAT TRIDENT's crew and, as a pilot, was considered an independent contractor.

Plaintiffs have sued Trident and Kaiser *in personam* as well as the JAYMAT TRIDENT *in rem* and allege that negligence of Trident and Kaiser and unseaworthiness of the JAYMAT TRIDENT (specifically, concerning defects in the pilot's ladder and lack of adequate medical attention) caused decedent's death.

II.

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs' Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, leaving just a § 905(b) general maritime negligence claim. Defendants make two arguments: first, that decedent was not an employee of either Trident or Kaiser; and second, that decedent was not a seaman as to either Trident or Kaiser in general or to the JAYMAT TRIDENT in specific. The Court agrees with both arguments.

A. *An Employee?*

It is now well established that an employer-employee relationship is essential for recovery under the Jones Act,

46 U.S.C. § 688. *E.g., Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co.*, 507 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1975), *clarified on other grounds*, 546 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1977).

Decedent's son, the river pilot, states by affidavit that defendants had a right to refuse decedent's services, could have discharged decedent, and paid decedent's "wages." None of these points, however, is inconsistent with defendants' position, to which decedent's son admitted in his deposition, that decedent was acting as an independent contractor through his Pilots' Association. *Cf. The CHINA*, 74 U.S. (8 Wall.) 53, 67-68, 19 L.Ed. 67 (1868) (the master may discharge a compulsory pilot, whom the vessel must pay). *Contrast Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace*, 378 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (affirming a Jones Act verdict in favor of plaintiff/river pilot, who had worked directly for the defendant over one year and was paid a monthly salary by the defendant; stating that that particular plaintiff "was permanently assigned as a pilot to one or another of defendant's tugboats"); *see also Daughdrill v. Diamond M Drilling Co.*, 447 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1971) (characterizing the plaintiff in *Pace* as "the salaried pilot [under] . . . his employer's specific instructions"), *cert. denied*, 405 U.S. 997, 92 S. Ct. 1261, 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972). *See generally* C. Black & G. Gilmore, *The Law of Admiralty* § 7-16, at 520 (2d ed. 1975) ("A pilot may be taken on voluntarily *or* under the compulsion of some local statute or regulation. The *voluntary* pilot is in much the same position as any other crew member." (emphasis added)).

Plaintiffs' effort to characterize the pilot fee as "wages" is insufficient to create a question of fact as to employee status. The elaborate statutory fee schedule and mandatory use of river pilots further support defendants' position. *See generally* La. RSA §§ 34:941-:1127 (West 1985

& West Supp. 1988).

As the Supreme Court stated:

> Pilots hold a unique position in the maritime world and have been regulated extensively both by the States and Federal Government. Some state laws make them public officers, chiefly responsible to the State, not to any private employer. Under the law and custom they have an independence wholly incompatible with the general obligations of obedience normally owed by an employee to his employer. Their fees are fixed by law and their charges must not be discriminatory. As a rule no employer, no person can tell them how to perform their pilotage duties.

Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 93-94, 75 S. Ct. 629, 634, 99 L.Ed. 911 (1955) (footnotes omitted). For example, unlike ordinary agents such as employees, compulsory river pilots in Louisiana are immune from liability to vessel owners and others—save for gross negligence or willful misconduct, claims for which only the Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners may hear. *See* La. RSA § 34:1001 (West Supp. 1988).

In sum, the Court holds that compulsory pilots in general are not covered by the Jones Act as to those whose vessels they pilot and that decedent in specific was not covered by the Jones Act as to Trident or Kaiser.

B. *A Seaman?*

The test for seaman status is also well established in this Circuit. For a person to be found a seaman, it must be established (1) that he was assigned permanently to a

vessel in navigation or performed a substantial part of his work aboard a vessel or a fleet of vessels *and* (2) that his work contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. *Offshore Co. v. Robison*, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959), *reaff'd en banc Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.*, 781 F.2d 1067, 1073-74 (5th Cir. 1986).

The question of seaman status is generally a jury question; where there is no reasonable basis to support a jury finding on the issue of seaman status, however, summary judgment denying seaman status is proper. *E.g., Lormand v. Superior Oil Co.*, 845 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied sub nom. Lormand v. Aries Marine Corp.*, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 739, 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988).

At issue is whether plaintiffs can satisfy the first prong of the *Robison* test. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that decedent was assigned permanently to the JAYMAT TRIDENT or performed a substantial part of his work aboard the JAYMAT TRIDENT or aboard a fleet of vessels owned by or having any connection with Trident or Kaiser. *Contrast Magnolia Towing*, 378 F.2d at 13. While it is probable that most, if not all, of decedent's work was done aboard vessels, such is insufficient to show that decedent was assigned to a *fleet* of vessels belonging to or having some connection to Trident or Kaiser (or, for that matter, any other single company), for the Fifth Circuit uses this term of art to mean "any group of vessels acting *together* or under *one* control." *Barrett*, 781 F.2d at 1074 (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that decedent's connection with any of the defendants was anything but transitory. *See id.* & n.9.

Because a plaintiff bears the burden to establish seaman status, the Court may not presume, without any

evidence on the point, that decedent served as a pilot only on the JAYMAT TRIDENT or only on vessels owned by or having even the most remote connection with Trident or Kaiser. *Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,* 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (where non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue for which summary judgment is sought, that party must oppose the motion with admissible evidence on the issue in order to defeat the summary judgment motion).

Plaintiffs argue that even if decedent was not a seaman, the rule under *Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,* 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946) (extending the warranty of seaworthiness to non-seamen), still survives as to river pilots despite the 1972 LHWCA amendment legislatively overruling *Sieracki* as to persons covered by the LHWCA, *see* 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Plaintiffs overlook this Circuit's rule that a marine worker is either a seaman or an LHWCA employee. *E.g., Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp.,* 812 F.2d 977, 982 (5th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied,* ____ U.S. ____, 108 S. Ct. 1013, 98 L.Ed.2d 978 (1988); *see* 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (LHWCA does not cover "a master or member of a crew").

In sum, the Court holds that decedent was not a seaman as to Trident or Kaiser or to the JAYMAT TRIDENT.[1]

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[1] Plaintiffs cite *Clark v. Solomon Navigation, Ltd.,* 631 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (no Jones Act claim allowed, but an unseaworthiness claim allowed by a river pilot) and *Ringering v. Compania Maritima De-La-Mancha,* 670 F. Supp. 301 (D. Or. 1987) (following *Clark*), *aff'd without published opinion,* 848 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1988). While holding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the permanent-assignment prong of the *Robison* test for Jones Act purposes, *Clark* disregards this same fact for the unseaworthiness claim in order to conclude that the plaintiff was not covered by the LHWCA on grounds of being a crew member;

III.

For these reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. The sole remaining claims are plaintiffs' general maritime negligence claims, which survive under § 5(b) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of October, 1988.

/s/ Patrick E. Carr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Footnote 1 continued.

further, *Clark* does not apply this Circuit's rule that every marine worker is either a seaman or an LHWCA worker.

Plaintiffs also cite Longshoremen's Act Opinion No. 22, 1928 A.M.C. 263 (1927), which states that a pilot is a "member of a crew of a vessel." While valid under limited circumstances, *see, e.g., Magnolia Towing*, 378 F.2d 12, the opinion likewise fails to address *Robison*'s permanent-assignment requirement.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Mar 27 89

HELEN EHRET BACH, ET AL.	Civil Action
VERSUS	No. 87-5899
TRIDENT SHIPPING CO., INC., ET AL.	Section "J"

JUDGMENT

Considering the Court's Order and Reasons of March 27, 1989,

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that there be judgment against all plaintiffs (Helen Ehret Bach, Eugene G. Bach III, and Janet B. Lashley) and in favor of all defendants (Trident Shipping Co., Inc.; Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp.; and the JAYMAT TRIDENT, *in rem*, her engines, tackle, appurtenances, equipment, etc.), dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice at their costs.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27 day of March, 1989.

/s/ Patrick E. Carr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATE OF ENTRY MAR 28 1989

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

March 27 89

HELEN EHRET BACH, ET AL.	Civil Action
VERSUS	No. 87-5899
TRIDENT SHIPPING CO., INC., ET AL.	Section "J"

Order and Reasons

CARR, J.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. By minute entry of March 16, 1989, the Court took the motion under submission on the briefs. For the following reasons, the Court now GRANTS the motion.

I.

On December 26, 1986, Eugene G. Bach Jr. suffered a fatal heart attack while aboard the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT as a compulsory river pilot. His surviving wife and two children have sued the vessel owner, the voyage charterer, and the vessel for his death.

Bach was a 61 year old male who had worked as a river pilot for about 36 years; he was a member of the Crescent City River Pilots Association, whose members serve as compulsory river pilots on the Mississippi River

between New Orleans and Pilottown.[1] Among his normal duties as a pilot were climbing pilot, or Jacob's, ladders[2] and climbing flights of stairs from the main deck of a vessel up to the wheelhouse of a vessel.

On December 26, 1986, Bach was to serve as the compulsory river pilot aboard the JAYMAT TRIDENT, an oceangoing bulk cargo vessel that is registered in and flies the flag of the Cayman Islands and whose officers are all Chinese. Early that morning, Bach was transported to the JAYMAT TRIDENT by a pilot boat, the M/V LITTLE RAY. The LITTLE RAY is equipped with two vessel boarding platforms affixed at the top of its wheelhouse; these platforms stand 11 feet 1½ inches above the waterline.

To board the JAYMAT TRIDENT, Bach stepped from one of the LITTLE RAY's boarding platforms onto a pilot ladder hanging on the port side of the JAYMAT TRIDENT and then climbed the ladder;[3] according to the vessel log, he boarded the vessel at 2:30 a.m. At that time,

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[1] Although some spell this location as two words (viz., "Pilot Town"), *see, e.g., Cenac Towing Co. v. Keystone Shipping Co.*, 404 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1968). *aff'g In re Cenac Towing Co.*, 276 F. Supp. 317, 320 (E.D. La. 1967), the preferred spelling appears to be as one word (viz., "Pilottown"). *See, e.g.*, 33 C.F.R. § 110.195(a)(2) (1987); La. R.S. § 34:996(A) (West Supp. 1989) *Allied Chemical Corp. v. Hess Tankship Co. of Delaware*, 661 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (Brown, J.).

[2] A pilot, or Jacob's, ladder is a rope ladder, generally with wooden steps, used to board larger vessels. *See, e.g., Nye v. A/S D/S Svendborg*, 501 F.2d 376, 378 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974), *cert. denied sub nom. The Svendborg v. Marine Engine Specialties Corp.*, 420 U.S. 964, 95 S. Ct. 1356, 43 L.Ed.2d 442 (1975).

[3] The record before the Court does not indicate how the top of the pilot ladder was attached to the vessel—whether it was attached directly to the side of the vessel or instead by way of a short accommodation ladder or some other means.

the deck of the JAYMAT TRIDENT stood 32.36 feet (9.86 meters) above the waterline. Thus, Bach had to climb on the pilot ladder a distance of at most about 21 1/4 feet.

Once aboard, Bach climbed four flights of stairs from the main deck to the vessel's wheelhouse, from which pilots would direct the vessel. When he reached the wheelhouse, he replaced the New Orleans/Baton Rouge compulsory pilot, Lewis H. Taylor, who then proceeded down the same stairs to disembark by the same pilot ladder. Soon thereafter (according to the vessel log, it was 2:32 a.m.), Bach suddenly collapsed to the floor.

According to Captain Jao Chih-ping's deposition, the quartermaster, who was in the wheelhouse when Bach collapsed, notified the captain, who returned to the wheelhouse; the captain tried to lift Bach, but was unable because Bach was unconscious; the captain then called back Taylor to resume piloting the vessel, asked Taylor to call the Coast Guard for medical help, and gave orders to drop anchor immediately; the second mate, who was the designated medical officer, came to the wheelhouse and, at Taylor and the captain's request, watched over Bach to see that no one tripped over him in the dark. According to Taylor's deposition, he returned to the wheel, took control of the navigation (according to the vessel log, it was 2:24 a.m.), and, while he was maneuvering the vessel to anchor, asked a crewmember to check Bach's pulse; the crewmember apparently found no pulse.

There is no evidence that either Taylor or any crewmember attempted to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or to give other direct first aid to Bach, other than what is set forth above.

According to the vessel log, the Coast Guard did not

arrive until 3:15 a.m. and emergency medical service technicians (para-medics) not until at 3:30 a.m. Their efforts to save Bach were to no avail; he was dead.

The Orleans Parish Coroner's Office performed an autopsy on Bach later that morning. It found that he had "severe stenotic calcific coronary atherosclerosis [with] recent ischemic myocardial changes." It classified his death as "natural." To paraphrase plaintiffs' expert medical report in layman's terms, Bach had a very acute heart disease and died from a heart attack.[4]

At his deposition, plaintiffs' medical expert, Dr. John H. Phillips Jr., testified (1) that the greater the physical stress Bach experienced just before his collapse, the greater was the likelihood that such stress played "an increasing role in his death" and (2) that a person climbing a ladder must exert more physical stress when such climbing requires the use of both hands and feet than when such climbing requires only the use of feet.[5] Further, he testified that Bach's chances of survival would have been greater had he received CPR within four minutes of his collapse, but added that even if a crewmember had administered CPR and even if ideal professional medical attention had been available minutes after his collapse, the likelihood that Bach would have died anyway way 85% or greater. To quote Dr. Phillips' report: "his chances for ultimate survival were clearly not very favorable . . . and the prognosis following even the ideal scenario as outlined

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[4] Specifically, the report states that Bach had "advanced occlusive coronary artery disease" and "suffered the onset of ventricular tachycardia and then ventricular fibrillation which ultimately resulted in his death." At his deposition, plaintiffs' medical expert more fully explained these conditions and their effects on Bach.

[5] *Cf. Browne v. Makin*, 177 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir. 1949) ("a Jacob's ladder . . . require[s] full use of [a person's] hands, arms, and feet").

[in the report] would be poor."

Defendants now move for summary judgment on three points:[6] (1) plaintiffs cannot establish legal causation from Bach's having to use a pilot ladder; (2) defendants owed no duty to apply CPR or other first aid to Bach; and (3) plaintiffs cannot establish legal causation from any inadequate medical attention on the crew's part because, according to plaintiff's own medical expert, the chances of Bach's dying even if he had had the best medical attention as soon as he collapsed were more probable than not.

II. *The ladder*

Plaintiffs argue that defendants should have provided Bach with an angled accommodation ladder[7] instead of a vertical pilot ladder for the access all the way from the pilot boat to the JAYMAT TRIDENT. As sole support, they cite SOLAS Regulation 17(a)(ii) for Safety of Navigation:

> Ships engaged on voyages in the course of

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[6] Plaintiffs argue that the motion is untimely. While the motion was brought after the Court's initial cut-off date, the Court exercised its discretion by granting defendants specific leave to bring the instant motion. *See Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co.*, 694 F.2d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir. 1983). *See generally* F.R.Civ.P. 16(b) (scheduling orders may be modified on good cause shown).

[7] For the Fifth Circuit's description of one accommodation ladder, see *Lamar v. Admiral Shipping Corp.*, 476 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The vessel was equipped with an aluminum accommodation ladder or gangway approximately thirty feet long and thirty inches wide with thirty steps. It was affixed to a turntable at the top with a through bolt, and the turntable was held in place with through bolts and plate. The base rested level on the cement apron of the dock on a roller. The steps were level."). For other descriptions and definitions, see *Nye*, 501 F.2d at 378 n.1; D. Tver, *Ocean and Marine Dictionary* 2 (1979).

> which pilots are likely to by employed shall comply with the following requirements:
> (a) *Pilot Ladders*
>
> . . . .
>
> (ii) The ladder shall be secured in a position so . . . that the pilot can gain safe and convenient access to the ship after climbing not less than 1.5 metres (5 feet) and not more than 9 metres (30 feet). ... Whenever the distance from sea level to the point of access to the ship is more than 9 metres (30 feet), access from the pilot ladder to the ship shall be by means of an accommodation ladder or other equally safe and convenient means.[8]

This regulation has been codified at 46 C.F.R. § 96.40-1(g) - for cargo vessels "that normally embark[ ] a pilot from a pilot boat or other vessel"'

> Whenever the distance from the water's edge to the point of access is more than 30 feet, access from a pilot ladder to the vessel must be by way of an accorrodation ladder or equally safe and convenient means.[9]

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[8] International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974), ch. V. regulation no. 17(a)(ii), *done* Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 243, T.I.A.S. No. 9700, at ____ (entered into force for the United States on May 25, 1980; not ratified by the Caymen Islands), *reprinted at* 6B *Benedict on Admiralty* Doc. No. 14-8, at 14-400 (7th ed. 1987).

[9] 46 C.F.R. § 96.40-1(g)(1987) (for "cargo and miscellaneous" vessels); *accord id.* § 32.90-1(g) (for tank vessels); *id.* § 77.40-1(g) (for passenger vessels); *id.* § 108.719(g) (for "mobile offshore drilling units operating under the U.S. flag"); *id.* § 195.40-1(g) (for oceanographic research vessels).

Because the Cayman Islands is not a signatory to SOLAS 1974, the CFR regulation applies to the JAYMAT TRIDENT, at least while it is within U.S. navigable waters. *See* 46 C.F.R. § 90.05-1(a).

Plaintiffs do not otherwise argue that the pilot ladder Bach climbed was defective or below industry or statutory standards in any way or that defendants or anyone else should have known that Bach or anyone else might suffer a heart attack from climbing this or any other pilot ladder. Nor do they present any evidence that Bach had any injury or accident while climbing or difficulty in climbing this pilot ladder or that Bach or anyone else had at any time complained about having to climb this or any other pilot ladder.

All parties agree that at least one of the two essentially identical regulations applies to the JAYMAT TRIDENT, whose freeboard for the period at issue exceeded 30 feet. The parties diverge, however, on the interpretation of the regulations.

Neither the SOLAS nor the CFR regulation requires that a ship is to extend an accommodation ladder from the ship all the way to a pilot boat whenever a pilot embarks the ship; specifically, the regulations do not read: "whenever a vessel's freeboard exceeds 30 feet, access from *another vessel* must be by way of an accommodation ladder, and no other means." Instead, the regulations merely require that access from *a vessel's pilot ladder* to its deck be by way of an accommodation ladder *or other safe means.*[10] In other words, the regulations specifically contemplate just what was in use on the JAYMAT TRIDENT, namely, the use of pilot ladders for vessels whose freeboards exceed 30 feet. In sum, there is no evidence that

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[10] For a description of this two-part arrangement, see *Nye*, 501 F.2d at 378 n.1. As indicated above in footnote 3, the record does not reveal how the pilot ladder was attached to the vessel. This information, however, is irrelevant: plaintiffs do not complain about the means by which the pilot ladder was connected to the deck and present no *evidence* that the means in use, whatever it was, was unsafe or had any causal connection to Bach's death.

defendants violated these regulations.[11]

Further, common sense rejects plaintiffs' position. To a large degree, as any seafarer knows, a vessel (especially a smaller vessel) often has little control over the everyday effects of waves and currents; even if a person knows the average size of waves at a given time or is very familiar with a given current, he rarely can foretell exactly how a particular wave or current may affect a vessel at any particular moment—just when and how far a vessel may rise, sink, rock, approach, or veer from a particular point. Seafarers must learn to compensate for these random, predictably unpredictable movements; thus is the art of navigation. Activities on and between vessels must anticipate the possibilities that natural phenomena often affect two near-by vessels very differently. Unlike accommodation ladders with their rigid frames more suitable for ship-to-shore movement when a vessel is tied down, pilot ladders are specially designed for the fluctuations in midstream vessel-changing operations such as those where a pilot boards a moving ship from a moving pilot boat.[12] Indeed, Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit has commented

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[11] It is a separate issue whehter an intended purpose of these regulations was to protect persons from over-exertion or instead whether the sole purpose of these regulations was to protect persons from falling or slipping or being struck by other objects. Because the Court finds no violation of these regulations, the Court need not address this separate issue.

[12] If a swell causes the pilot boat suddenly to rise or rock, or to shift its lateral position, relative to the larger vessel, then a rigid ladder could knock into someone or something with considerable force or quickly move away from a person attempting to board it. The examples are numerous, the point is the same: these dangerous problems are less likely to occur with a flexible rope ladder than with a long rigid projection from a large vessel.

that the use of pilot ladders is "routine."[13]

Because plaintiffs do not otherwise argue any violation of a statutory provision concerning ladders[14] and do not otherwise produce any evidence of a duty or custom for defendants to use an accommodation ladder that extends all the way from the JAYMAT TRIDENT to the LITTLE RAY or any evidence of negligence on the part of defendants in not using such a ladder, no basis of liability may lie for defendants' failure to provide such an accommodation ladder.

As plaintiffs concede,[15] climbing pilot ladders and several flights of stairs is a normal and customary part of any river pilot's job.[16] While the ordinary exertion and stress from the climb may have been what triggered Bach's heart attack, " '[a] heart attack due to . . . physical exertion and stress, which are an integral part of a [pilot's] work, is not a harm that can reasonably be anticipated or guarded against.' "[17] In other words, such exertion and stress was

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[13] *See S/S Bethflor v. Thomas*, 364 F.2d 634, 635 n.4 (5th Cir. 1966); *see also Garcia v. Dover Shipping Co.*, 380 F. Supp. 607, 609 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("A Jacob's ladder is of widespread use for boarding ships."), *aff'd without published op.*, 511 F.2d 1392-93 (3d Cir. 1975).

[14] The SOLAS regulation at issue does provide that a pilot be able to gain access to a ship after climbing not more than 30 feet. Here, however, it is undisputed that Bach did not have to climb more than 30 feet in travelling from the LITTLE RAY to the main deck of the JAYMAT TRIDENT.

[15] *See* Pre-Trial Order, ¶ 7(4), at 8.

[16] *See Browne*, 177 F.2d at 766.

[17] *Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd.*, 667 F.2d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (affirming a summary judgment dismissing a widow's general maritime negligence claim for the wrongful death of her longshoreman husband) (quoting *Raymond v. I/S Caribia*, 626 F.2d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 451 U.S. 969, 101 S. Ct. 2045, 68 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981)).

not from any negligence on defendants' part.

In sum, there is no evidence of a genuine dispute that defendants were at all responsible for Bach's heart attack.[18]

III. *CPR and first aid*

The sole remaining basis for liability is the alleged failure to provide adequate, timely first aid to Bach when he collapsed.[19]

Defendants assert that they owed no duty to provide first aid to Bach; in support, they cite "the general tort rule that no one has a duty to go to the assistance of another."[20] While defendants accurately describe the majority state law rule, general maritime law imposes at least a minimal duty on the facts here: a vessel that takes aboard a person—be he even a passenger or guest—owes that person "a duty to exercise 'reasonable care to furnish such aid and assistance as ordinarily prudent persons would render under similar circumstances.' "[21] To the extent that a

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[18] *Cf. Carlton v. M/G Transport Services, Inc.*, 698 F.2d 846, 848 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (affirming a directed verdict for defendant who had no prior knowledge of decedent seaman's heart condition, where decedent died of a heart attack while at work on defendant's vessel).

[19] *See Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey*, 403 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1968) (upholding wrongful death Jones Act award, where "[p]laintiff did not allege that decedent's heart attack was caused by Defendant, but rather [by] the failure of Defendant to provide prompt and adequate medical attention for a man who was obviously ill and unable to care for himself while aboard the ship.").

[20] *Lazzell v. Booker Drilling Co.*, 816 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1987).

[21] *Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star*, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988); *see Walsh v. Zuisei Kaiun K.K.*, 606 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1979) (ship owed

ship's crew voluntarily attempts more than is legally required to save a person in danger, "liability for negligent salvage is limited to situations in which the salvor, through want of due care, has worsened the position of the victim."[22]

In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiffs present evidence that prudent crewmen may well have done considerably more than did the JAYMAT TRIDENT's crew. Specifically, they present evidence that a prudent master or officer would have been familiar with CPR techniques[23]—the inference being that at least one such

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Footnote 21 continued.

drowning compulsory pilot a duty of rescue, even where there was no negligence on its part for the incident that created the need for the rescue); *cf. Theodories v. Hercules Navigation Co.*, 448 F.2d 701, 703 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971) (reversing judgment for widow whose husband died of a heart attack aboard a vessel, but noting that the vessel did owe him "the maritime duty of due care"). *But see Wilcox v. Carina Maritime Corp.*, 586 F. Supp. 1475, 1479 (E.D. Tex. 1984) (there is no legal duty for a ship's crew to aid a longshoreman who suffers a heart attack on the ship).

As support for the duty to provide aid to Bach, plaintiffs cite 46 U.S.C. § 2303(a), which applies when "a vessel [is] involved in a marine casualty." The statute appears not to apply here, where the JAYMAT TRIDENT itself was not in any danger (viz., where there was no vessel collision, allision, grounding, power failure, etc.). *See Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 759 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985); *cf. Publicover v. Alcoa Steamship Co.*, 168 F.2d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1948) (former 33 U.S.C. § 367, upon which § 2303 is based, did not impose a duty on a vessel owner whose vessel was not in a collision). In any event, subsection (c) of the statute makes it clear that the statutory duty is the same as the general maritime duty described in *Barbetta*, namely, reasonable care under the circumstances. *See Berg*, 759 F.2d at 1430.

[22] *Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc.*, 412 F.2d 1011, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969), *certs. dism'd*, 396 U.S. 1033, 90 S. Ct. 612-13, 24 L.Ed.2d 531 (1970).

[23] For this evidence, plaintiffs cite provisions of two international conventions that require masters and chief officers to have certain minimal

person would have recognized Bach's predicament and immediately attempted to give him CPR, even in the emergency situation where the whole vessel was in danger because there was no pilot at the wheel. This evidence is enough to create a genuine dispute whether the captain and crew acted reasonably in the actions they took, that is, whether defendants breached their duty of care to Bach.[24]

It is a separate issue, however, whether this genuine

Footnote 23 continued.

knowledge of medical care and first aid techniques. *See* International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, App. to Reg. 11/2, § 13, *done* July 7, 1978 (entered into force for the United States on Apr. 28, 1984; not ratified by the Cayman Islands), *reprinted in* 6(A) *Benedict on Admiralty* Doc. 9-38, at 9-199 (7th ed. 1985); Convention Concerning Health Protection and Medical Care for Seafarers, art. 9(2), *done* Oct. 1987, I.L.O. No. 164 (not yet entered into force), *reprinted in* 6(A) *Benedict on Admiralty* Doc. 9-9, at 9-40 to 9-40.1 (7th ed. 1988). Further, they supply an expert report by a pilot/marine consultant, Dean Bruch, who all but explicitly states that any ship's officers should know how and when to administer CPR.

Defendants argue that neither convention applies here since the JAYMAT TRIDENT flies the flag of the Cayman Islands, which has ratified neither convention. The Court notes that these conventions, even if not applicable of their own force, may perhaps be evidence of universal custom among oceangoing vessel officers, but that the relationship between custom and conventional international law—exactly what is needed to establish international custom—is hotly debated. Because of Bruch's report, the Court need not address these issues.

[24] With Captain Jao's deposition testimony that he and Taylor asked the second mate "to examine the collapsed [pilot]—take a look to care of him," plaintiffs suggest that defendants may have voluntarily assumed to do more than was legally required. The Court need not decide whether this evidence is sufficient to support their suggestion, for there is no evidence, as required under *Grigsby* for a "good samaritan" to be liable under general maritime law, that any crewmember placed Bach in any worse position than he would have been otherwise.

dispute is one concerning a *material* fact.[25] It is not enough for plaintiffs to prove the breach of a duty; they must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such breach was a proximate cause of Bach's death.

Under general maritime law,[26] plaintiffs cannot establish that improper medical attention was the proximate cause of a person's death unless they prove that " 'a proper diagnosis and treatment . . .*would likely have prevented* the loss of this life.' "[27]

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[25] *See Williams v. Adams*, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir.) (citing *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)), *reh'g denied mem.*, 844 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1988); *see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.").

[26] Plaintiffs argue that Louisiana law applies. This is plainly wrong. *See e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 358 U.S. 625, 628, 79 S. Ct. 406, 408, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). Thus, the court does not address whether Louisiana courts would extend the "loss of chance at survival" doctrine, *see Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospital*, 498 So. 2d 713, 720 (La. 1986), beyond the narrow confines of medical malpractice actions governed by La. R.S. § 9:2794 (A)(3). *See Agoff v. Town of Jean Lafitte*, 464 So. 2d 847, 850 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (affirming jury verdict for defendant, where he was negligent per se in rendering ambulance care to a fatal heart attack victim, but where there was insufficient evidence to show that it was more likely than not that the victim would have survived had the defendant rendered proper care). *See generally* Annotation, *Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality*, 54 A.L.R.4th 10 (1987). This Court has not found a single maritime case where this rule has been applied against any defendant.

[27] *Rewis v. United States* [*Rewis III*], 503 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting *Rewis I*, 369 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1966) (citing *Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp.*, 361 U.S. 107, 80 S. Ct. 173, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959))) (emphasis added in *Rewis III*), *reh'g denied*, 506 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). While New Mexico law was the governing law in *Rewis*, the Fifth Circuit, in citing to *Sentilles*, looked to general maritime law for its authority on the issue of medical causation.

Plaintiffs' own medical expert testified that even if a crewmember had immediately applied CPR to Bach and even if a professional medical crew had boarded the ship immediately thereafter to apply further medical attention, the chances of Bach's dying anyway were, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 85% or greater.[28] In other words, the only evidence before the Court shows that it was more probable than not that Bach would have died no matter what treatment was given to him. Thus, it is immaterial that optimal medical attention might have slightly improved Bach's chances of survival.[29]

Footnote 27 continued.

Compare Barrios v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 290 F.2d 310, 311 (5th Cir. 1961) (affirming judgment for defendant, where decedent seaman disappeared overboard; holding that even if defendant was negligent in not acting quickly enough, such was insufficient for a basis of liability where there was "a complete want of evidence tending to show that [the missing seaman] . . . might have been rescued") *with Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.*, 310 F.2d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 1962) (directing judgment for widow of drowned seaman effort, where "there [was] a reasonable possibility of rescue" had defendant not been negligent in its rescue efforts).

[28] This 85% figure was based on Dr. Phillip's assumption that the paramedics would have brought certain equipment (viz., an electrical defibrillator) with them on the ship; there was no evidence that the paramedics who did arrive had such equipment. Dr. Phillips testified that without such equipment, the chances of survival are less than 5% even with CPR.

In his expert report for plaintiffs, Bruch states that Bach's chances of survival would have been 30% had CPR been commenced within four minutes of his collapse. While the difference between 85% and 70% is immaterial for purposes of this motion, the Court notes that Bruch's report shows no indication that he has any medical expertise and thus that he is qualified to give such an opinion. *See generally* F.R.Ev. 702.

[29] *Wilcox*, 586 F. Supp. at 1480; *see Fitzgerald v. Manning*, 679 F.2d 341, 356 & n.14 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Virginia law, but noting that the "federal rule" is the same).

In sum, plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact whether any improper medical attention on defendants' part was a proximate cause of Bach's death. Thus, summary judgment for defendants is proper.

IV.

For these reasons,[30] the Court dismisses plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice at their costs. Judgment shall enter accordingly forthwith. The Court directs all counsel to advise all witnesses under subpoena for trial that the trial is cancelled.

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[30] By Order and Reasons of October 18, 1988, adhered to Minute Entry of November 4, 1988, ____ F. Supp. ____, the Court dismissed plaintiffs' Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims on the ground that Bach was neither an employee nor a seaman as to any of the defendants. The instant Order and Reasons does not depend in any way on the earlier Order and Reasons and would not differ if Bach had been a Jones Act seaman of any of the defendants.

Because the Court dismisses plaintiffs' complaint on other grounds and because defendants do not raise these issues in their motion, the Court does not address the following several issues:

(1) Whether plaintiffs have standing to maintain their suit, *see generally Neal v. Barisich, Inc.*, ____ F. Supp. ____, ____ n.1 (E.D. La. 1989) (Carr, J.) (discussing personal representatives);

(2) what damages, if any, may be sought on behalf of the decedent's two adult children, *see Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling Co.*, 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), *reh'g denied mem.*, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S. Ct. 1205, 89 L.Ed.2d 318 (1986); *Truehart v. Blandon* [*Truehart I*], 672 F. Supp. 929, 934 n.5 (E.D. La. 1987); *Neal*, ____ F. Supp. at ____ & nn.38-39;

(3) whether the complaint states a cause of action against the voyage charterer, *see Balfer v. Mayronne Mud & Chemical Co.*, 762 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1985); and

(4) whether plaintiffs have made an effective Rule 9(h) designation, which precludes them from receiving a jury trial, *see Truehart v. Blandon* [*Truehart III*], 685 F. Supp. 956, 959 (E.D. La. 1988).

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27 day of March, 1989.

/s/ Patrick E. Carr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
APR 27 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 91-1481

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

HELEN EHRET BACH, EUGENE G. BACH, III and JANET B. LASHLEY,

Petitioners

v.

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION,

Respondents

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC. AND KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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April 27, 1992

WILSON - EPES PRINTING CO., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Respondents, Trident Steamship Company and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, disagree with the statement of the question presented by Petitioners. The questions presented for consideration are:

1. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on remand from this Court, correctly determined, in accordance with *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander*, —— U.S. ——, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991), that petitioners' decedent, a land-based, independent contractor who served as a river port pilot, was not a "seaman" entitled to state a claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688?

2. Whether the seaman's status question raised by petitioners is inappropriate for review in this case in light of the uncontradicted evidence demonstrating the absence of causation between respondents' asserted conduct and pilot Bach's death, whether or not Bach was a seaman?

LIST OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND RULE 29.1 LIST

The parties to the proceeding below were petitioners/plaintiffs, Helen Ehret Bach, Eugene G. Bach, III, Janet Bach Lashley, and respondents/defendants, Trident Steamship Company, Inc. and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. Although petitioners named the vessel, the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT, *in rem*, as a defendant and a respondent, petitioners never seized the vessel. Thus, the vessel was not a party in the courts below and is not a party before this Court.

Pursuant to this Court's Rule 29.1, respondent, Trident Steamship Company, Inc., certifies that it is owned by Standard Shipping, Inc. and various individual owners. Trident has no subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.

Pursuant to Rule 29.1, respondent, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, certifies that it is owned by KLU Holdings, Inc. and Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co. Its subsidiaries that are not wholly owned are as follows: Anglesey Aluminum Limited, Bauxita Da Amazonia Limitada, Delta Holdings, Inc., Hopewell International Insurance, Ltd., Kaiser Jamaica Bauxite Company, Oakland City Center Hotel Company, Inc., Queensland Alumina Finance N.V., Queensland Alumina Holdings N.V., Queensland Alumina Limited, Queensland Alumina Security Corporation, Second Queensland Alumina Security Corporation, Tortuga Casualty Company, United Insurance Company, and Volta Aluminum Company, Limited.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-1481

HELEN EHRET BACH, EUGENE G. BACH, III and JANET B. LASHLEY,

Petitioners

v.

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION,

Respondents

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC. AND KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents, Trident Steamship Company, Inc. and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, submit that there is no basis for granting a writ of certiorari in this case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as ordered by this Court's mandate in No. 90-1578, reconsidered its opinion in light of *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander*, —— U.S. ——, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). The Fifth Circuit correctly determined that its prior decision was consistent with *Wilander* and that decedent Bach, a land-based river port pilot with no employment relationship with any vessel owner, could not qualify as a seaman under the

Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688. *Bach v. Trident Steamship Co., Inc.* [*Bach II*], 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991); Petitioners' Appendix, A-2.

Even assuming that a river port pilot's status as a seaman under the Jones Act presented a reviewable question, the undisputed facts render review inappropriate in this case. Petitioners' inability to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence rendered summary judgment appropriate whether or not decedent was a seaman, thus negating any legal issue that this case may otherwise present.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

While petitioners have accurately set forth a summary of the proceedings in this case, Petition 3-5, their factual statement excludes many undisputed, substantive facts that are important to evaluation of the petition. The opinions below (*see* Petitioners' Appendix, A-11 to A-42, A-44 to A-59), while referencing most of the relevant facts, do so throughout the text of several opinions. Thus, respondents restate the relevant facts as follows:

On December 26, 1986, petitioners' decedent, Eugene G. Bach, a Mississippi River port pilot (and not a "bar pilot" as petitioners erroneously label him), collapsed and died aboard the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT shortly after he arrived on the deck of that vessel. Although Bach's death resulted from a serious occlusive coronary artery disease, commonly known as "hardening of the arteries," and could have as easily occurred in his living room as on the vessel, petitioners filed this lawsuit seeking to hold respondents responsible for his death.

A. The Practice of Pilotage under Louisiana Law

Under Louisiana law, "river port pilots" have the exclusive right to provide pilotage services to most vessels on the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Pilottown (at the mouth of the river). *See* La. Rev. Stat.

34:996.[1] The fees charged by the river port pilots are set by regulation. *See* La. Rev. Stat. 34:997, 1121(A), 1122(A)(1)(a). Masters, owners, and agents of vessels traversing the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Pilottown are required by law to hire a river port pilot or face severe civil and criminal penalties for failing to do so. *See* La. Rev. Stat. 34:1002, 1002.1, 1009. Louisiana law authorizes the river port pilots to form an association. *See* La. R.S. 34:995. As allowed by Louisiana law, the river port pilots have formed and operate out of the Crescent River Port Pilots Association. The pilots' association, as was done in this case, assigns one of its member pilots to a vessel when it receives a call from a vessel's master, owner, or agent. A pilot boarding boat then transports the assigned pilot to the oceangoing vessel, whereupon the pilot boards the vessel and then assists in navigating it between the aforementioned points.

Two of the petitioners in this case, Eugene G. Bach, III, decedent's son and a river port pilot like his father, and Mrs. Helen Bach, decedent's wife, testified as to the nature of pilotage as practiced by the river port pilots. Their testimony indicates that pilots are independent contractors—not employees of any particular vessel owner—and are not part of the crew of any vessel. River port pilots merely sail with a vessel between two points in the Mississippi River. River port pilots have no regular, continuous, or permanent connection with any vessel and leave the vessel before it reaches the Gulf of Mexico. The IRS Form K-1 forwarded to decedent's estate by the pilots' association indicated that the pilots' association acts as a partnership in passing the income it collects from pilotage fees down to its members. Decedent Bach was a member of the association through his personal corporation. Thus, the pilots' association forwarded the

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[1] The Louisiana statutes regarding pilotage cited in this opposition are reproduced in the appendix to this writ opposition at A-1 to A-3.

IRS Form K-1 reflecting decedent's corporation's share of the pilotage income to his personal corporation. In turn, decedent's personal corporation employed decedent.

B. The Underlying Facts

One of the normal duties of a river pilot is to reach the deck of the vessel to which he is assigned by climbing a rope-railed, wooden rung pilot ladder. Once the pilot reaches the deck via the pilot ladder, his normal duties include ascending several flights of stairs to reach the ship's bridge or wheelhouse. Decedent Bach, 61 years old at the time of his death, had been performing such duties for over 30 years.

Early on the morning of December 26, 1986, a pilot boat transported Bach to the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT, an ocean-going vessel headed down the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico. Bach stepped onto the pilot ladder from a platform on the top of the pilot boat and climbed the pilot ladder approximately 21 feet to the ship's deck.[2] He then ascended four flights of stairs from the deck to the vessel's bridge. According to the vessel's deck log, Bach reached the wheelhouse on the ship's bridge at 2:30 a.m. and relieved Pilot Taylor, the Baton Rouge to New Orleans pilot. The record is devoid of any evidence indicating that Bach suffered any injury or had any difficulty reaching the bridge.

Two minutes later, at 2:32 a.m. according to the vessel's log, Bach unexpectedly collapsed and became unconscious while the vessel was in navigation and proceeding down the Mississippi River. The vessel's quartermaster

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[2] The summary judgment evidence indicated that the freeboard of the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT, *i.e.*, the distance between the vessel's deck and the surface of the water, was no more than 32.36 feet, and probably was somewhat less. The pilot boat platform from which Bach boarded the vessel was 11 feet, 1½ inches above the water line. Thus, Bach's climb on the pilot ladder was no more than approximately 21 feet.

called the vessel's captain, who was standing on the port side bridge wing waiting for Pilot Taylor to descend the pilot ladder. The captain ran to the wheelhouse, where he saw Bach lying on the floor. He ran back to the port wing and yelled for Pilot Taylor to return to the bridge.

Pilot Taylor returned to the bridge and took control of the vessel, which was in an emergency situation. At the request of the vessel's captain, Pilot Taylor called for emergency medical assistance and brought the vessel to anchor. Although Pilot Taylor called for medical assistance shortly after his return to the bridge at 2:34 a.m., emergency medical personnel did not arrive until some time after 3:00 a.m. (the deck log lists the time of arrival as 3:30 a.m.). While the vessel was being maneuvered to anchor, a crewmember checked Bach and found no pulse. When paramedics arrived, they checked Bach and also found no pulse. Bach was placed on a stretcher and transported to shore.

C. The Medical Evidence

While petitioners seek to hold respondents responsible for Bach's death, the uncontradicted medical evidence, including the deposition testimony of petitioners' own medical expert, demonstrates that Bach had severe "hardening of the arteries" and would have died regardless of the vessel's actions.

Decedent was transferred from the vessel to the Orleans Parish Coroner's Office, where an autopsy was performed. The Coroner classified decedent's death as "natural," resulting from "severe stenotic calcific coronary atherosclerosis as well as other conditions."

Petitioners' medical expert, Dr. John H. Phillips, the head of cardiology at Tulane University Medical Center, testified by deposition that decedent had occlusive coronary artery disease, commonly known as "hardening of the arteries." Decedent had only "pinpoint lumens" in his arteries, meaning that his arteries were 90 to 99 percent

blocked. Dr. Phillips classified decedent's condition at the time of his death as extremely serious. He testified that had he examined decedent before his death, he would have instructed him to stop working and to refrain from physical activity and would have scheduled him for immediate coronary bypass surgery.

Dr. Phillips explained that Bach's death resulted when the restricted blood flow through the clogged arteries caused "ventricular fibrillation," that is, "where the electrical activity of the heart, particularly in the ventricles, is so distorted that there is no effective cardiac contraction." As a result, the heart stops pumping. After ventricular fibrillation is present for a few minutes, in some cases only a few seconds, it can only be reversed, and the person can only be saved, by electrical shock treatment using a special medical device known as a defibrillator. Dr. Phillips testified that in more than 90 percent, and probably more than 95 percent of the cases where ventricular fibrillation sets in, a defibrillator is needed to save the party. Dr. Phillips stated that defibrillators are found primarily in hospitals, in some doctors' offices, and possibly in some emergency medical units, and that they are not likely to be equipment aboard an ocean-going cargo vessel.[3]

Dr. Phillips further testified that the more advanced the condition, the less likely the person's chances of survival, even if CPR and electrical defibrillation had been promptly administered. He opined that the overwhelming majority of persons with decedent's condition would not have survived, even had CPR and electrical defibrillation been promptly administered. Outside a hospital Coronary Care Unit, decedent's chances of survival were extremely slim.

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[3] Furthermore, many emergency medical units are not equipped with defibrillators. The emergency medical unit that responded to the ship's call for help was not so equipped.

Dr. Phillips also testified that while decedent's activity in climbing aboard the vessel *may* have been a factor in his death, he could not state that decedent would not have collapsed and died if he had not engaged in that activity. Nor could he state that decedent would not have died had he climbed an accommodation staircase rather than a pilot's ladder. Dr. Phillips opined that someone with decedent's severe heart condition could have suffered a heart attack while sleeping, sitting, watching television, or walking; there is no standard precipitating event. He testified that just as many heart attacks occur at rest as during exercise, maybe more.

Dr. Phillips assessed Bach's chances of dying, even if CPR *and electrical defibrillation* had been promptly administered, at 85 percent *or somewhat greater*, with his chances of survival possibly in the 0 to 10 percent range.

D. The Proceedings

The sole question remaining in this case is whether the courts below correctly dismissed petitioners' Jones Act claim on grounds that decedent was not a Jones Act seaman. The district court granted the vessel's summary judgment motion dismissing petitioners' Jones Act claim, finding that decedent had no permanent connection with the JAYMAT TRIDENT or with any definable fleet of vessels associated with either Trident or Kaiser. *See* Petitioners' Appendix, A-39 through A-41.

On January 10, 1991, the Fifth Circuit entered its opinion and judgment affirming the district court's judgment. *Bach v. Trident Steamship Co., Inc.* [*Bach I*], 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991); Petitioners' Appendix, A-11 to A-35. The Court of Appeals, employing its longstanding test first enunciated in *Offshore Co. v. Robison*, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), found that decedent, a land-based river pilot, was not a seaman. The court found that while decedent's job as a river pilot contributed to the function or mission of a vessel, decedent had no permanent connec-

tion to the vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels as required to be a seaman. 920 F.2d at 324-26; Petitioners' Appendix, A-12 to A-17.

Petitioners then filed their first writ of certiorari with this Court. In that proceeding, this Court granted a writ and remanded the case for further consideration in light of *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. 807 (1991). *Bach v. Trident Steamship Co., Inc.*, 111 S.Ct. 2253 (1991); Petitioners' Appendix, A-10. The Fifth Circuit, as ordered by this Court, thereafter reconsidered its decision in light of *Wilander* and concluded that that decision did not affect its conclusion that pilot Bach was not a seaman. *Bach v. Trident S.S. Co.* [*Bach II*], 947 F.2d 1290, 1291 (5th Cir. 1991); Petitioners' Appendix, 11.

Petitioners now file this second petition.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S *WILANDER* DECISION

Petitioners contend that the Fifth Circuit on remand erroneously applied its *Offshore v. Robison* test in determining whether pilot Bach was a seaman. Petitioners argue that *Wilander* overruled *Robison* and that the appropriate question under *Wilander* is whether the party claiming seaman status would have been a seaman before the passage of the Jones Act in 1920. Petition, 7-8. They assert that the pre-1920 jurisprudence clearly considered pilots as seamen, and thus, pilots should be considered seamen under the Jones Act. Petition, 8-13.

Petitioners further argue that pilot Bach must be a Jones Act seaman, because he cannot be a worker covered under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). They contend that a 1927 opinion of the United States Employees Compensation Commission,

i.e., the agency then charged with administering the LHWCA, had opined that a river pilot is included within the "master or member of a crew" exclusion to LHWCA coverage. Referencing this Court's statement in *Wilander* that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive, petitioners contend that the administrative interpretation holding a pilot within the "master or member of a crew" exclusion from LHWCA coverage necessarily renders pilots as "seamen" under the Jones Act. Petition, 13-15. Petitioners contend that the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA did not alter the "master or member of a crew" exclusion from LHWCA coverage, and therefore, did not affect his status via the Jones Act and the LHWCA. Petition, 15-17.

In concluding, petitioners cite to a district court case, *Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co.*, 767 F.Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1991), in which a pilot was held to be a seaman. Petition, 18.

Initially, petitioners incorrectly assert that *Wilander* overruled the Fifth Circuit's longstanding *Robison* seaman's status test. In *Wilander*, a Fifth Circuit case like the present case, that court of appeals applied its *Robison* test in finding that Wilander, an oilfield worker assigned to a paint boat in the Persian Gulf, was a seaman. Under the *Robison* test, a person is considered a seaman if: (1) he or she is permanently attached to or performs a substantial part of his or her work aboard a single vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels *and* (2) if the person's employment contributes to the function or mission of the vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels. *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 809. The sole issue reviewed by this Court in *Wilander* involved the second part of the *Robison* test. McDermott, the petitioner in *Wilander*, argued that a mere contribution to the function or mission of the vessel did not render the party a seaman. McDermott argued that the correct seaman's status test was the stricter test applied by the Seventh Circuit in *Johnson v. John F.*

Beasley Construction Co., 742 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985). *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 809-10. Under the *Johnson* test, seaman's status depends on whether a party's employment makes "a significant contribution to the maintenance, operation or welfare of the *transportation function* of the vessel," and not merely the general function or mission of the vessel. *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 810, *quoting Johnson*, 742 F.2d at 1063 (emphasis supplied).

As the Fifth Circuit correctly stated in its decision on remand, *Bach II*, 947 F.2d at 1291; Petitioners' Appendix, A-2, the specific question addressed in *Wilander* was "whether one must aid in the navigation of a vessel in order to qualify as a 'seaman' under the Jones Act." *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. 809. *Wilander* did not question the requirement that seaman's status requires a permanent, *employment-related* connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels. After weighing the conflicting circuit court jurisprudence regarding this question, this Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that seaman's status does not require that the person claiming seaman's status must contribute to the *transportation* function of the vessel; he or she must only have contributed to the overall function *or mission* of the vessel. 111 S.Ct. at 817. Thus, this Court did not, as petitioners assert, overrule the *Robison* test. Insofar as the Court considered the *Robison* decision, the Court *affirmed* that definition of seaman's status.

Furthermore, while this Court in *Wilander* looked to the pre-1920 definition of seaman and the LHWCA "master or member of a crew" exclusion in evaluating whether a person claiming seaman's status must assist with the *transportation* function of the vessel, this Court did not blindly hold, as petitioners suggest, that all persons casually labeled by the courts as seamen before 1920 necessarily are seamen under the Jones Act. The Court recognized that the LHWCA altered the definition of a "seaman" by defining out of the scope of that term land-based maritime workers. *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 817. The purpose

of the LHWCA was to remove land-based maritime workers from the scope of Jones Act coverage while leaving as seamen sea-based maritime employees. *Id.*, 111 S.Ct. at 813-14. Thus, the phrase, "master or member of a crew," as used in the LHWCA exemption from coverage "restates who a 'seaman' under the Jones Act is supposed to be: a *sea*-based maritime *employee*." *Id.*, 111 S.Ct. at 814 (emphasis supplied).

The Court also recognized that an employer/employee relationship is a necessary prerequisite to Jones Act seaman's status. The plaintiff must owe his or her allegiance to a vessel at sea—*not to a land-based employer*. *Id.*, 111 S.Ct. at 813-14, 817. "The key to seaman's status is *employment*-related connection to a vessel in navigation." *Id.*, 111 S.Ct. at 817 (emphasis supplied).

Thus, in holding that a seaman (1) must be sea-based and not land-based, (2) must have an employment-related connection to a vessel, and (3) must aid in the function of the vessel, this Court in *Wilander* identified the same factors identified by the Fifth Circuit in *Robison*: a seaman must have a permanent attachment to a vessel or perform substantial work aboard a vessel (or, at the very least, aboard an identifiable fleet of vessels). *See Robison*, 266 F.2d at 779. The Court also recognized that whether a particular individual is a seaman depends on the facts of each case, and not on generic classifications. 111 S.Ct. at 818.

Furthermore, in *Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni*, 112 S.Ct. 486 (1991), a case understandably ignored by petitioners, the Court, quoting from *Wilander*, again found that "[t]he key to seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation." 112 S.Ct. at 492. The Court rejected the contention that a person's classification determines coverage under the Jones Act and LHWCA. *Id.* Each case requires an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiff has an "employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation." *Id.*

While the circuits may have disagreed before *Wilander* and *Gizoni* regarding the "aid in the transportation" requirement, they had agreed that seaman's status is dependent on the plaintiff having an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation. Consistent with *Wilander*, *Gizoni*, and the Fifth Circuit *Robison* test, all other circuits that have considered the issue have held that, for a party to be considered a seaman, the party must have such a connection with a vessel. *E.g.*, *Stafford v. Perini Corp.*, 475 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir. 1973); *Klarman v. Santini*, 503 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1974), *cert. denied sub nom. Connecticut v. Klarman*, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); *Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp.*, 521 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); *Whittington v. Sewer Construction Co., Inc.*, 541 F.2d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 1976); *Petersen v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.*, 784 F.2d 732, 737 (6th Cir. 1986); *Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction Co.*, 742 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); *Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc.*, 506 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); *Stanfield v. Shellmaker, Inc.*, 869 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1989); *Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc.*, 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir. 1990).

There is no basis for granting a writ in this case. In reconsidering its original decision on remand, the Fifth Circuit correctly determined that the principles announced in *Wilander* required it to reinstate its original opinion. *Bach II*, 947 F.2d at 1291. The Fifth Circuit's finding that decedent was not a seaman was based on the uniformly agreed-upon requirement that seaman's status requires that the party have a permanent, *employment*-related connection to a vessel, or at the very least, with an identifiable fleet of vessels. As the Fifth Circuit stated, "Bach's survivors do not seriously argue that he was attached to or did substantial work on board the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT. The record clearly reveals that he ful-

filled neither requirement." *Bach I*, 920 F.2d at 324; Petitioners' Appendix, A-13.

The *uncontradicted* evidence in this case supports the Fifth Circuit's conclusion. Decedent, a *compulsory* pilot, was not aboard the vessel as a matter of the vessel owner's choice. Having been dispatched by his pilots' association, he was aboard because Louisiana law requires a pilot to be aboard and severely penalizes any vessel owner who fails to use a river port pilot. La. Rev. Stat. §§ 34:1002, 1002.1, 1009. Decedent was not an employee of the vessel or its owner or charterer. He was an employee of his personal corporation. Two of the three petitioners in this case, decedent's widow, Helen Bach, and decedent's son, Eugene G. Bach, III (who, like his father, is a river pilot), testified in their respective depositions that decedent had no permanent connection with any vessel. Decedent's son testified that river port pilots merely assist a vessel between two points in the Mississippi River. He further testified that river port pilots have no regular, continuous, or permanent connection with any vessel, and that they leave the vessel before it reaches the Gulf of Mexico. Decedent's wife *agreed* that river port pilots *are not members of any vessel's crew*. There is no evidence in this case that decedent had any employment-related connection with any vessel owner or that he had any permanent connection with any identifiable fleet of vessels owned or controlled by respondents. Decedent simply engaged in river port pilotage as an independent contractor on random vessels as assigned by the pilots' association.[4]

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[4] This Court has recognized the independence of pilots and their want of allegiance to any employer:

> Pilots hold a unique position in the maritime world and have been regulated extensively both by the States and Federal Government. Some state laws make them public officers, chiefly responsible to the State, not to any private employer. Under law and custom they have an independence wholly incompatible with the general obligations of obedience normally owed by an

Thus, petitioners' own testimony verifies the correctness of the Fifth Circuit's decision. Decedent *cannot* be a seaman because petitioners' own testimony conclusively established that he lacked the permanent, employment-related connection to a vessel recognized as necessary by this Court and by every circuit that has addressed the issue. Because, under the uncontested facts, petitioners could not meet their burden of proof regarding a material element of seaman's status, the Fifth Circuit correctly sustained the dismissal of petitioners' Jones Act claim. *E.g., Celotex Corporation v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Nor do the authorities cited by petitioners provide any basis for finding pilot Bach a seaman. Neither *United States v. Thompson*, 28 Fed.Cas. 102 (No. 16,492) (C.C.D. Mass. 1832), *Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe*, 69 U.S. 450 (1865), *The China*, 74 U.S. 53 (1869), nor *Cooley v. Board of Wardens*, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852) contains any analysis of the requirements for seaman's status, even outside the context of the Jones Act and the LHWCA.[5] The remaining cases cited by peti-

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> employee to his employer. Their fees are fixed by law and their charges must not be discriminatory. As a rule no employer, no person can tell them how to perform their pilotage duties.

Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1955) (footnotes omitted).

[5] *Cooley* questioned the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's statutory compulsory pilotage scheme for the Port of Philadelphia. *Thompson* involved a criminal mutiny charge against a crewmember. *Joliffe* questioned the validity of the compulsory pilotage regulations governing the Port of San Francisco. *The China* questioned whether a vessel *in rem* and a vessel owner *in personam* were responsible for the collision damages caused by a pilot's negligence.

If relevant at all, *The China* supports respondents' position. While the vessel *in rem* was held to be responsible for the pilot's negligence, the ship owner, having not voluntarily chosen the *compulsory* pilot as its servant, was held to have no personal responsibility for the pilot's negligence. *See also* T.J. Schoenbaum, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 12-5 at 438-39 (1987).

tioners involved "pilots," who, unlike pilot Bach, had a long-term employment relationship with a single vessel and vessel owner. *The Lud Keefer*, 51 Fed. 44 (3d Cir. 1892) (which involved a pilot hired to assist a vessel on a voyage from Pittsburgh to Louisville and back); *The Mary Elizabeth*, 24 Fed. 397 (C.C.S.D.Ala. 1885) (which involved pilots hired on a vessel for terms of four and six months); *Wilson v. The Ohio*, 30 Fed.Cas. 149 (No. 17,825) (E.D.Pa. 1834) (which involved a suit by the pilot, the firemen and the deckhands of the named vessel, which navigated the Delaware River between Philadelphia and the State of Delaware). These "pilots," unlike Bach, would have met the *Wilander-Gizoni* requirement of an "*employment*-related connection to a vessel in navigation." *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 817; *Gizoni*, 112 S.Ct. at 492. Thus, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the historical jurisprudence on which they rely *does not* support the proposition that port pilots, like pilot Bach, who are land-based, independent contractors who board numerous vessels for a few hours at most, are "seamen."

Also, the 1927 LHWCA opinion upon which petitioners rely, Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 22 (1927), *reproduced at* 1928 A.M.C. 263-64, provides no basis for granting a writ. In that opinion, the United States Employees Compensation Committee relied on a number of 19th Century cases opining that a pilot was within the "master or member of a crew" exception to LHWCA coverage. *Id.*

While administrative determinations *sometimes* are entitled to deference, such is not always the case. Statutory interpretation must begin and end with the plain language of the statute unless the statutory language is unclear. *See Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). Furthermore, administrative interpretations are not entitled to deference when a sound judicial analysis finds a contrary reading of the statute as supported by statutory language, purpose, and history:

> [T]he "deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which re-

> sults in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." . . . [The courts] must not "rubber stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute."

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983), *quoting American Ship Building Co. v. National Labor Relations Board*, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965), and *National Labor Relations Board v. Brown*, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965).

This Court plainly held in *Wilander* and *Gizoni* that an employment-related relationship is a mandatory prerequisite for a person to be a seaman under the Jones Act. All of the authorities cited in this 1927 administrative opinion predate both the Jones Act and the LHWCA. None of these cases purports to address whether a port pilot has the necessary *employment* relationship to be considered a seaman for purposes of personal injury or death benefit recovery. Two of the cases, *The China*, discussed above, and *Camp v. The Marcellus*, 4 Fed.Cas. 1141 (No. 2,347) (D.Mass. 1860), *aff'd*, 66 U.S. 414 (1862), discussed the liability of a vessel and its owner for collision damages. The remaining two cases discussed in this administrative opinion, *United States v. Lynch*, 26 Fed.Cas. 1033 (No. 15,648) (S.D.N.Y. 1843), and *United States v. Forbes*, 25 Fed.Cas. 1141 (No. 15,129) (E.D. Pa. 1845), dealt with the pilot's authority in the context of jury charges given in criminal cases wherein seamen were charged with revolt and mutiny for failure to obey a pilot's orders.

Thus, the authority cited in this dated, LHWCA administrative opinion does not support the conclusion that river port pilots have the required *employment* relationship to be considered as Jones Act seamen. Because this opinion did not consider the mandatory *employment* requirement of Jones Act seaman's status, it is plainly

inconsistent with the Jones Act and the LHWCA. The courts are not bound to follow such an unsupported administrative interpretation that is in clear derogation of a statutory requirement.

Perhaps more importantly, this administrative opinion is not entitled to judicial deference because it directly conflicts with the Jones Act as interpreted in *Wilander* and *Gizoni*. *Wilander* and, more particularly, *Gizoni* held that whether a particular person is covered by the Jones Act or the LHWCA depends on the facts and circumstances peculiar to each individual case; generic classifications, such as "ship repairman" or "pilot," are not conclusive as to whether a person is covered by one act or the other. *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 818; *Gizoni*, 112 S.Ct. at 498. Thus, petitioners' interpretation of this administrative opinion—that all persons generically labeled as "pilots" are automatically seamen—directly conflicts with the fact-intensive, case-by-case determination that *Wilander* and *Gizoni* require. Under the undisputed facts of this case, discussed above, pilot Bach, a land-based, independent contractor who had no employment relationship with any vessel, was not a seaman. Bach boarded vessels owned by many different owners for only a few hours at a time before he returned ashore. Under *Wilander* and *Gizoni*, the LHWCA, not the Jones Act, covers such land-based maritime workers who owe no allegiance to any vessel. *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 813-14; *Gizoni*, 112 S.Ct. at 492.

Also, sound policy reasons dictate that this Court make no class-based exceptions to the fact-intensive seaman's status inquiry mandated in *Wilander* and *Gizoni*. As the Fifth Circuit correctly noted, several classes of workers who more clearly face the perils of the open sea than did decedent have been denied status as seamen, because they did not meet the seaman's status requirements. *Bach I*, 920 F.2d at 325. Workers, such as those who navigate vessels on the open seas on sea trials, who work aboard

fixed structures on the open sea, and who service vessels at sea owned by various owners, have not been considered seamen, because they lack the permanent, *employment*-related connection to a vessel that seaman's status requires. *Id.* Making a class-based exception to the employment requirement for all port pilots would not only ignore the fact-intensive nature of this status determination required by *Wilander* and *Gizoni* with regard to pilots, but would open the door to similar class-based exceptions for other classifications of offshore and inland maritime workers who also lack an employment-related connection to a vessel. To make the classification-based exception urged by petitioners is to "muddy the waters" clarified by *Wilander* and *Gizoni* as to the requirements of seaman's status.

Finally, petitioners' reliance on *Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co.*, 767 F.Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1991) provides no basis for granting a writ. The *Evans* court held that a port pilot, like pilot Bach, was a seaman under the Jones Act. However, in reaching that conclusion, the district court supported its conclusion with the same unmeritorious arguments asserted by petitioners in the instant case. While paying only lip-service to the particular facts of the case, 767 F.Supp. at 1291, the court relied heavily on the pre-Jones Act jurisprudence and the 1927 LHWCA administrative opinion generically classifying pilots as seamen. 767 F.Supp. at 1289-91. The court did not examine the relationship between Evans and the vessel owner; it merely assumed that since the ship owner hired Evans through his pilots' association, an employment relationship must have existed. 767 F.Supp. at 1291. However, *Wilander* and *Gizoni* make clear that seaman's status requires more than a *contractual* relationship for seaman's status; it requires that persons seeking seaman's status have an "*employment*-related" connection with the vessel. *Wilander*, 111 S.Ct. at 817; *Gizoni*, 112 S.Ct. at 492.

Furthermore, whether or not Evans demonstrated the necessary "employment-related" connection—and whether

that decision is right or wrong under the particular facts of that case—makes no difference to the present case. In the instant case, the *undisputed* facts are that pilot Bach was employed by his own corporation—not the vessel owner—and that his pilotage corporation was an independent contractor—not an employee—that supplied pilotage services to vessels. The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that under the particular facts of this case, Bach was not a seaman.

In *Wilander* and *Gizoni*, this Court established the rules for determining whether a person is a seaman entitled to sue under the Jones Act. The decision of the Fifth Circuit is consistent with the principles announced in those cases. This case presents no question for review, and the Court should deny petitioners' request for a writ of certiorari.

II. RESPONDENTS' ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAUSATION AND BURDEN OF PROOF GROUNDS RENDERS THIS CASE INAPPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW

Even if the question asserted—whether a pilot can be a seaman under the Jones Act—were appropriate for review, the undisputed facts render this case an inappropriate vehicle for considering the question. Respondents were entitled to summary judgment whether or not decedent was a seaman.

Whether a plaintiff's claim is under the Jones Act or the general maritime law, a plaintiff seeking recovery must prove *by a preponderance of the evidence* that the fault of the defendant caused the plaintiff's purported injury. *E.g.*, *Diebold v. Moore McCormack Bulk Transport Lines*, 805 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing that plaintiff must prove the elements of his Jones Act case by a preponderance of the evidence); *Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.*, 839 F.2d 1085, 1092 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that both under Texas law and the Jones Act, plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the

evidence); *Litherland v. Petrolane Offshore Const. Services*, 546 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming a jury instruction requiring plaintiff to prove the elements of his Jones Act case by a preponderance of the evidence); *Matter of Hechinger*, 890 F.2d 202, 208 (9th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied sub nom. Caskie v. Hechinger*, 111 S.Ct. 136 (1990) (citing *Litherland* and recognizing that plaintiff's burden under the Jones Act is to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence).

Summary judgment is appropriate where the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that plaintiff is unable to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. *Celotex, cited above*, 477 U.S. at 322-23. The mere existence of a "metaphysical doubt" as to material facts does not preclude summary judgment. *Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute is not genuine so as to render summary judgment inappropriate unless the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict on the issue for either party. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986).

In this case, petitioners alleged that defendants were negligent in two respects: (1) in failing to administer CPR to decedent immediately upon his collapse, and (2) in allegedly requiring him to climb a pilot ladder for a distance greater than allowed by applicable regulations. However, the undisputed evidence, summarized above, plainly demonstrated that petitioners could not meet their burden of proof on either claim. Petitioners' own expert, Dr. John H. Phillips, the head of cardiology at Tulane University Medical Center, testified that the cause of decedent's death was his hardening of the arteries—which were 90 to 99 percent blocked—not any negligence of the vessel. Dr. Phillips placed decedent's chances of dying from his heart condition, even if CPR and electrical defibrillation had been administered immediately, as *greater than 85 percent, with his chances of survival possibly in*

the 0 to 10 percent range. Dr. Phillips further testified that decedent's chances of dying were just as likely whether he was climbing aboard a ship, sleeping, or sitting in his living room while watching television. Thus, petitioners could not meet their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any alleged negligence caused decedent's death.

Furthermore, petitioners' pilot ladder claim totally lacked merit, because the distance decedent climbed up the ladder was well within the distance allowed by applicable maritime regulations. *See Bach I*, 920 F.2d at 327; Petitioners' Appendix, A-18 to A-19.

Because respondents were entitled to summary judgment regardless whether pilot Bach was a seaman, this case is an inappropriate one to address the seaman's status question urged by petitioners.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, respondents, Trident Steamship Company, Inc. and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, respectfully submit that this Court should deny petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

R.S. 34:995. Association of river port pilots

The said river port pilots may form themselves into an association as to them may seem fit, not in conflict with law, or with the rules and regulations of the river port pilot commissioners, but nothing herein shall affect any association presently existing.

R.S. 34:996. Operating territory

A. The river port pilots shall have the exclusive right to pilot vessels on the Mississippi River between New Orleans, Louisiana and Pilottown, Louisiana and within the Port of New Orleans between Southport and Meraux-ville; within the Industrial Canal, between the Mississippi River to and including Lake Pontchartrain; within the Intracoastal Canal, between the Industrial Canal and the turning basin at Michoud, inclusive; also for the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet between the Industrial Canal and Mile 28.3, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway from the Louisiana-Mississippi state line to the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, including Michoud Slip and Michoud Canal, Chef Pass, Algiers Cutoff, and the Harvey Canal; the Venice Jump within six and one-half miles of the Mississippi River, Bayou Sauvage; and Bayou Liberty.

B. However, nothing herein contained shall prevent an exchange of river port pilots at what is known as "Quarantine Anchorage" or "The Point" or "General Anchorage" between the river port pilots herein named and pilots engaged in the piloting of vessels above Southport, nor shall anything herein provided prevent pilots engaging in piloting vessels above Southport from ending or beginning the pilotage from any wharf or "The Point" or "General Anchorage" in the Harbor of New Orleans.

R.S. 34:997. Pilotage fees; vessel subject to pilotage

A. The river port pilots shall be entitled to ask for and to receive a fee for their pilotage services.

B. The fees for pilotage services shall be established in accordance with R.S. 34:1121, *et seq.*

C. The river port pilots shall also be entitled to enter into agreements with the masters, owners, or their agents, of ships and vessels, not otherwise subject to compulsory pilotage as provided by these statutes, for special services, boats, equipment, transportation, and other necessary fees at such rates and for such sums as may be agreed between them, but not to exceed those rates established in accordance with R.S. 34:1121, *et seq.*

D. All vessels shall employ a river port pilot when navigating the operating territory described in this Subpart except those vessels exempted by the laws of the United States or vessels of one hundred gross tons or less.

E. In case of refusal to take such river port pilot, the master, owner, agent, or consignee of any vessel required to employ a river port pilot shall pay the established pilot fee as if a river port pilot had been employed.

R.S. 34:1002. Violations and penalties

Anyone attempting to exercise the functions herein vested in the said river port pilots, who has not been commissioned by the governor, shall be fined not less than one thousand five hundred dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not less than thirty days, nor more than four months, or both, at the discretion of the court in whose jurisdiction the offense is committed.

R.S. 34:1002.1. Employing pilot without a state commission; penalties

A. No master, owner, or agent of a vessel required under this Subpart to take a state commissioned river port pilot shall perform the duties of a river port pilot nor employ a person who is not a state commissioned river port pilot.

B. Whoever violates this Section shall be fined not less than one thousand five hundred dollars nor more than

five thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.

R.S. 34:1009. Employing pilot without a commission; liability of vessel, master, and owner

A vessel which is required to use a river port pilot pursuant to this Subpart and fails to do so when a river port pilot offers his services, the vessel, its captain, and owners shall be liable for a civil penalty and shall forfeit to the state of Louisiana the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, with privilege on the vessel, to be recovered before any court of competent jurisdiction. An action for forfeiture under this Section may be brought by the attorney general of the state of Louisiana or by the Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners. If a judgment is obtained hereunder, the court shall include in its judgment an award for reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the prosecution of such action.

R.S. 34:1121. Pilotage fee commissions; composition

A. A separate pilotage fee commission shall exist relative to each pilot association established and operating under state law. Each pilotage fee commission shall be nominally designated by the name of the association to which it relates, followed by "Fee Commission".

R.S. 34:1122. Fees and charges; adjudication of disputes

A. (1) Each fee commission shall have exclusive authority to fix and establish reasonable and just fees and rates for:

(a) Pilotage service to ships and vessels.

* * * *

MOTION FILED
APR 27 1992

No. 91-1481

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1991

HELEN EHRET BACH, EUGENE G. BACH, III and JANET B. LASHLEY,

Petitioners,

versus

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION AND THE VESSEL, THE JAYMAT TRIDENT,

Respondents.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF OF THE AMICUS CURIAE AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND LOUISIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Should pilots now suddenly be denied seaman status despite their having been accorded that status since before the Jones Act's enactment?

No. 91-1481

In The

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October Term, 1991

HELEN EHRET BACH, EUGENE G. BACH, III and JANET B. LASHLEY,

Petitioners,

versus

TRIDENT STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC., KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION AND THE VESSEL, THE JAYMAT TRIDENT,

Respondents.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes the American Trial Lawyers Association and Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association, who respectfully represent that they have an interest in whether writs are granted in the matter at bar. The Trial Lawyers submit that their amicus curiae brief would be of value to the court and accordingly move for leave to file same. As of this filing date the defendant in this matter, Trident Steamship Company, Inc. through their attorney Robert

H. Murphy, has not yet consented in writing to the filing of this brief.

Respectfully submitted,

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The American Trial Lawyers Association and the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Trial Lawyers") are composed of over 62,000 lawyers engaged in litigation practice.

This amicus curiae brief, presented on behalf of both organizations, supports the position of petitioner.

The purpose of this brief is to convince this Honorable Court that compulsory pilots are quintessential seamen and fall exactly within the class of traditional maritime workers for whom the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, was designed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

(A SAILOR IS ALWAYS A SEAMAN BUT A SEAMAN IS NOT ALWAYS A SAILOR)

This case involves the specific question of whether a compulsory pilot is a seaman under the Jones Act. The Trial Lawyers support petitioner's position that since pilots were considered seamen at the time of the Jones Act's enactment, they still maintain that status today.

For traditional seamen, status is essentially a qualitative rather than a quantitative question. The *Robison*[1] test was not designed to identify traditional "blue water" seamen. Instead, it provides an analytical tool used most frequently in the context of employees engaged in offshore oil and gas production. These offshore workers are

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[1] *Offshore Co. v. Robison*, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)

exposed to both the perils of the sea, and hazards associated with amphibious industrial employment. The *Robison* test, which embodies the concept of "brown water seamen", was specifically designed to identify these nouveau seamen. The Trial Lawyers urge this Honorable Court to recognize that there exist certain classes of maritime employment, such as pilots, whose occupations are so "salty" that persons engaged in those occupations are "seamen per-se".

ARGUMENT

For time out of memory mariners have gone to sea in ships risking life and limb to carry trade between nations. They rely on a special class of mariner to guide them past treacherous reefs, shoals, and rocks that lie between the open sea and their port of destination. This class of mariner is the local pilot.

By ancient right, pilots were considered mariners.[2] This venerable tradition was carried forward into American Admiralty law as this Honorable Court had occasion to note in *McDermott International Inc. v. Wilander,* 498 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 807 at 811, 812, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991).

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[2] Laws of Wisbuy; Rules of Oleron. Peters, Admiralty Decisions in the District Court of the United States for the Pennsylvania District (1807), Appendix to Vol.1

In fact, pilots were considered seamen under the general maritime law when Congress passed the Jones Act.[3]

The term "seaman" in the Jones Act is undefined. The Courts, therefore looked to the existing general maritime law for guidance. Therefore, as pilots were seamen before the Jones Act, afortiori they are seamen under the Jones Act.

Further evidence that pilots are seamen can be gleaned from Congressional regulations concerning pilots. These laws are found in Title 46 dealing with shipping and, in fact, come under Title II *Vessels and Seamen,* Part F "**Manning of Vessels**". Clearly, the implication is that Congress considers pilots to be seamen.

This position has been addressed by petitioner and in the interest of avoiding a "me too" brief, the Trial Lawyers instead will focus on another compelling rationale which also supports affording seaman status to compulsory pilots.

In *Bach v. Trident Steamships Company, Inc.*, 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991), Judge Brown's persuasive dissent focuses on the historical precedent for a pilot being a seaman. Both the majority and Judge Brown, however, make an assumption about the analytical framework of determining seaman status for traditional seamen, to wit – that the "*Robison*" test is the determinative starting

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[3] *The China,* 74 U.S. 53 (1868); *Steamship Company v. Joliffe,* 69 U.S. 450 (1864); *Cooley v. Board of Wardens, The Port of Philadelphia,* 53 U.S. (12 HOW) 299 (1852); *The Mary Elizabeth,* 24 Fed.397 (CC SD ALA 1885); *The Lud Keefer,* 51 Fed.44 (3 CCA 1892)

point. The dissent in *Bach* would make an "exception" to the *Robison* test. The real problem however is in applying the analytical framework of *Robison* to traditional seamen, i.e. using a brown water test to identify blue water seamen.

This Honorable Court, in *Wilander*, supra, pointed to a conceptualization of seamen status that embraces personnel such as compulsory pilots. The result reached by applying *Robison* to the traditional seaman in the instant case, together with this Court's guidance in *Wilander*, confirms the inapplicability of *Robison* to those who are employed in traditional maritime occupations.

Wilander meticulously traced the origin of the term "seaman" in American Admiralty law. Noted with approval was Justice Story's pronouncement in *U.S. v. Thompson*, 28 F.Cas. 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832) that

> "a cook and steward are seamen in the sense of the maritime law, although they have peculiar duties assigned to them. So a pilot, a surgeon, a ship carpenter, and a boatswain are deemed seamen, entitled to sue in the admiralty."

Wilander, supra at 811.

Further, this Court found that in the 19th Century, the preeminent admiralty treatise had concluded that a seaman did not have to aid in navigation and quoted the distillation by that treatise as follows:

> "the term mariner includes all persons employed on board ships and vessels during the voyage to assist in their navigation and preservation, or to promote the purposes of the voyage."

Wilander at 812 citing E. Benedict, the American Admiralty, Section 278, p.158 (1850).

This Honorable Court further quoted Benedict in the following passage,

> ". . . . all the persons who have been necessarily or properly employed in a vessel as co-labourers to the great purpose of the voyage, have, by the law, been clothed with the legal rights of mariners – no matter what might be their sex, character, station, or profession."
>
> *Wilander* at 812.

Though *Wilander* was primarily concerned with whether the aid in navigation test was still required, important guidance is nevertheless provided as to general principles on seaman status. This Court stated that:

> "[W]e believe it settled at the time of *The Osceola* and the passage of the Jones Act that general maritime law did not require that a seaman aid in navigation. It was only necessary that a person be employed on board a vessel in furtherance of its purpose. We conclude therefore that, at the time of its passage, the Jones Act established no requirement that a seaman aid in navigation."
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> *Wilander* at 813.

And when addressing the relationship of a master or member of the crew under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act 33, Section 901 et seq. and seaman under the Jones Act, this Court stated:

> "We believe that the better rule is to define "master or member of the crew" under the LHWCA, and therefore "seaman" under the

> Jones Act, solely in terms of the employees connection to a vessel in navigation. This rule best explains our case law, and is consistent with the pre-Jones Act interpretation of "seaman" and Congress' land/based/sea/based distinction. All who work at sea in the service of the ship face those particular perils to which the protection of maritime law, statutory as well as decisional, is directed. [Citations omitted] It is not the employee's particular job that is determinative, but the employee's connection to a vessel."
>
> *Wilander* at 817.

And finally, in announcing the actual rule in *Wilander* the Court stated

> "The key to seaman status is employment related connection to a vessel in navigation. . . . in this regard we believe the requirement that an employee's duties must "contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission" captures well an important requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship's work."
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> *Wilander* at 817.

These passages from *Wilander* illustrate the essential characteristics necessary for seaman status i.e. an "employment related" connection to the vessel in doing the ship's work. Pilots unquestionably enjoy this relationship and therefore are seamen under the mandate of *Wilander*.

ROBISON'S ORIGINS DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS NOT DESIGNED FOR TRADITIONAL SEAMEN

While *Robison* grappled with attempting to delineate the boundaries of seaman status, it looked to a series of cases by this Honorable Court and lower Courts including *South Chicago Coal and Dock Company v. Bassett*, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); *Summerlin v. Massman Construction Company*, 199 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1952); *Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand and Gravel Company*, 202 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1953); *Gahagan Construction Corp. v. Armao*, 165 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1948); and *Texas Company v. Gianfala*, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), rev'd 350 U.S. 879 (1955). In each of these cases, seaman status was found despite the fact that the claimants were not performing traditional seaman's functions. This observation made in *Robison* confirms the Court was considering non-traditional seamen. A further clue is left when the Court noted that the "key case in the conversion of offshore oilfield workers into seamen" was *Gianfala, Robison* 774. Clearly, *Robison* was dealing with and fashioning a test for non-traditional seamen, to wit- offshore oilfield workers.

ROBISON WAS DESIGNED FOR BROWN WATER SEAMEN

The *Robison* court recognized that in extending the protection of seaman status to "brown water" seamen, it was doing so because the brown water seamen shared the same marine risks that blue water sailors were exposed to. *Robison* at 780. The expansion of seaman status was consistent with the liberal construction of the Jones Act and consistent with its purpose. *Robison* at 780.

The Court also noted that the legislative history of the Jones Act contained no indication that Congress intended to limit the law to only conventional members of a ship's company. The implicit conclusion, of course, is that it always applies to conventional members of the ship's company. The absence of any legislative restriction permitted the concept of seaman status to evolve and accommodate unconventional vessels such as those used in the oil industry. *Robison* at 780. *Robison* was specifically designed to define the crew of these unconventional vessels.

THE WORD "CREW" DOES NOT HAVE A SINGLE MEANING

While traditionally the term crew does not have "an absolutely unvarying, legal significance", there are certain classes of employment that are so maritime in character that those engaged in that employment are always seamen. (See *Bassett*, supra.) These classes of employment are those that were consistently recognized as seamen in the general maritime law prior to the enactment of the Jones Act. For example, an illustrative list of those classes were identified by Justice Story while sitting as a circuit judge in *United States v. Thompson*, supra. As noted earlier, Justice Story declared that a cook, steward, surgeon, ship carpenter, boatswain and pilot were deemed seamen entitled to sue in admiralty. While recognizing that this is only an illustrative, and by no means exhaustive list, these employees were clearly considered to be seamen

prior to the Jones Act's enactment. The common denominator that these occupations have is that they are traditional blue water employees. These are the personnel that traditional admiralty law had in mind when it declared that seamen are wards of the Court. To subject these mariners to the same test used in identifying hybrid (brown water seamen) is inconsistent with traditional maritime law concepts. Furthermore, this was never the intent or the purpose of *Robison*.

THE TERM "SEAMEN" HAS TWO MEANINGS

As used in the maritime law of this country, there are effectively two meanings to the word "seamen". In its traditional and classical sense, the word "seamen" encompasses blue water sailors. However, when used in the context of the Jones Act, the term "seamen" identifies a larger group of individuals including employees that also face the same or greater risks than blue water sailors encounter. Offshore petroleum workers, for example, run all the risks attendant, incident, and inherent to oil drilling and exploration in addition to the standard perils of the sea. Such workers are seamen under the Jones Act, *Robison* at 780.

CONCLUSION

Robison was not designed to and therefore has limited efficacy in identifying blue water seamen. How then do we determine seaman status for persons engaged in traditional blue water occupations. Perhaps the "obscenity"

analogy is appropriate; the term "seaman" is difficult to define however, at least with regard to traditional mariners, we can easily recognize one when we see one.

Traditional blue water employees, by their very nature, meet the requirement expressed in *Wilander* for "doing the ship's work" in that they are contributing to the function of the vessel as well as the accomplishment of its mission. They are indisputably doing the work of the vessel and are therefore always seamen vis a vis whichever vessel or group of vessels they happen to be performing these duties on or for. They are, in effect, "seamen per-se". Such a designation for traditional blue water seamen would promote a logical policy rationale consistent with the purpose of the Jones Act, which is to make recovery on the part of employees in these hazardous marine industries easier to prove than in the usual civil tort case. *Thornton v. Gulf Fleet Marine Corp.*, 752 F.2d 1074, 1076 (5th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the fact that the Jones Act has always been liberally construed likewise compels a finding that pilots clearly are and deserve seaman status. *Robison*, supra.

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